‘Red lines’ of the democratic initiative

This phrase, however, has over the last several years frequently been used by politicians, who employ it without paying much attention to its proper usage. By referring to this phrase, they try to state the principles or issues about which they will not make any concession or which they will not open to discussion. This expression adds some harshness to the political discourse. When you sit at the bargaining table, you use this phrase to put pressure on your opponent.

In an à la turca political debate, this harshness is particularly significant because the debates relating to an issue are conducted with an emphasis on bargaining. In the East, bargaining is commonly used to settle on the price of a particular product, and is a considerably open-ended process. Tourists visiting the Grand Bazaar in İstanbul are frequently exposed to this form of bargaining. The important thing is to know how to bargain. A vendor may say that the price of a souvenir is TL 500 while the real value of that product might be, say, TL 50. Thus, if you don’t have an idea about the cost of that souvenir, it is virtually impossible for you to find its real price.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is trying to solve the Kurdish problem by resorting to methods of deliberative democracy. When transferred to Turkish politics, this technique, developed in Anglo-Saxon democracies, is translated into an environment of debates conducted via bargaining. In this bargaining method, there is a great abyss between the real intentions and how much compromise can be made. Standing on one side of this abyss, a politician makes his “no bargain” warning by referring to “red lines.”

CHP’s red lines

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) joined the debate conducted in Parliament about the government’s democratic initiative by drawing its red lines even with greater emphasis. The CHP has five main red lines: (1) No constitutional amendment can be made on an ethnic basis; (2) The definition of the nation cannot be changed; (3) Education in the Kurdish language cannot be allowed; (4) Separation projects cannot be implemented; and (5) Counterterrorism efforts cannot be abandoned and no concession can be made in this regard.

The first item concerns the constitutional definition of citizenship and the inclusion of the words “Kurd[s]” or “Kurdish” in the Constitution. The third item clearly rejects education in the mother tongue. The last item refuses any bargaining with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The second and fourth items are nothing but abstract expressions. The important thing about these lines is that they are characterized by a prevailing military approach. The CHP does not offer any solution to the Kurdish issue, but only talks about prohibitions. Let us return to the military’s definition of “red lines.” Faced with a complex problem which they cannot solve, the military simply opts to set prohibitions about it. That is why the military dictatorial rules impose a plentitude of bans and prohibitions and turn the country into a prison.

The CHP does not have any project to solve the Kurdish issue. It only wants to say, “You cannot enter these zones,” while the government lists its proposals or Kurds make demands. It makes no explanation about the reasons or justifications or rational consequences of these items. It just defines them as red lines.

OK, but what are their margins set for bargaining purposes?

The government’s red lines

The government does not have any openly declared red lines. Back from the start, the government has always refrained from announcing any red line. Also, it has not made any clear commitment about the positive content of the initiative. Looking at the matter from the outside, we can still explain this picture by referring to the analogy of bargaining in an Eastern marketplace. Two opponents -- one a potential buyer and the other a seller -- shake hands, and keeping their hands in this state and shaking them aggressively, they try to intimidate each other, thereby convincing the other of the seriousness of their bid. The seller asks, “How much money will you give for it?” Eyes fixed on the commodity in question, the potential buyer gives a similar response, “How much money do you want for it?” In short, the price is not yet set, i.e., there is uncertainty as to the situation.

So far the government has not made any explanation about the content of the initiative. Instead, it has made an interesting move which the opposition cannot comprehend. It just implemented the initiative. Significant advances have been made. Almost all this progress has been made while opposition parties were chanting criticisms of “we do not know anything about the content of the initiative.”

What was done, then?

With an amendment to prison regulations, the ban on speaking in one’s mother tongue during visits paid to prison inmates by their relatives was abolished, which was a big problem. State TV started broadcasting programs in Kurdish for 24 hours a day. The establishment of private TV stations that will air Kurdish programs was allowed. Civil registers started to accept Kurdish names in their records. Recently, a citizen named his child “Kurdistan.” The reverting of names of geographical locations to their originals is making quite a progress quietly. It is now possible to establish Kurdish language and Kurdish literature departments.

The progress the democratic initiative contains is obvious to a certain extent: the re-naturalization of people who committed political crimes but were not involved in armed conflict, the non-imprisonment of children who throw stones at security authorities, the evacuation of the Makhmour camp, the possibility of holding retrials, the strengthening of local administrations, the expansion of freedom of expression, the introduction of elective courses in Kurdish, and the wide usage of Kurdish as the mother tongue.

Are there any red lines the government has specified for the initiative? There are boundaries -- instead of red lines -- which go beyond the government’s power and which seem impossible to surmount. First and foremost, none of the constitutional amendments can be made by the government. This automatically concerns the definition of citizenship and education in one’s mother tongue. Inserting addition letters into the alphabet in order to better represent Kurdish words or utterances is an artificial problem because there is no actual obstacle to the use of these letters.

The AK Party is losing votes in western Turkey. Thus, we can say that the real red lines are set by the balance of votes. While managing the initiative, the government is required to remain balanced. According to bargaining conventions, the government is to keep its word when it gives one. This is because where it now stands is not suitable for bargaining.

Inside the wide-ranging spectrum, where the PKK together with the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) are two opposite ends, the government should try to focus on maintaining negotiations, instead of bargaining. The PKK’s only wish is to make sure that the democratic initiative accepts it as a legitimate side. It thinks that if it can do this, the organization and its policies will be legitimized in the eyes of the Kurdish people. This PKK expectation is a red line of the government. A government that negotiates with the PKK has no chance of staying in office.