Who holds the strings in the Kurdish opening?

It remains doubtful that this party will attract further votes if the Kurdish initiative is successful because developments show the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is losing support in the west while the same developments may contribute to the rise of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the Southeast. On the other hand, the AK Party is a political party that is able to resolve this problem. The government is eager to proceed with the opening and do this without retreating. However, it is inevitable that steps to be taken in such a case will remain short and that the moves will be subjected to a process of testing. Otherwise, it may not be possible to keep the Kurdish initiative in control, and this will spell the end of the AK Party. We must for this reason acknowledge that the ruling party is treading on slippery ground and that this is its choice.

Now we have come to the responsibility of politicians who claim to represent the Kurds because, obviously, the Kurds will benefit from the process most and, for this reason, they have to be constructive. A while ago, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan said the process may be completed in three phases: First, Kurdish rights would be protected and guaranteed. The Kurds would need to prove that they would give up their secessionist ambitions and renounce violence. In the second phase, the PKK would remove its militants from border areas and the state would allow the Kurds to govern themselves. In the final stage, militants in the mountains would come back to their homes and state assurances would be reflected in laws and directives.

It seems Öcalan has something in mind for every stage. We are therefore currently talking about a roadmap that includes simultaneous and mutual steps by both parties. The government has no problem with the initial and final stages of this roadmap. The list of demands announced by militants crossing the Turkish border included fairly reasonable requests for the government, including the use of the Kurdish language and the provision of opportunities for Kurds to freely express their identity. Moreover, these requests are presented as part of the initiative to democratize Turkey further; however, the statement on self-governance in the second phase of the roadmap announced by Öcalan is vague. Indeed, Öcalan deliberately used such a vague statement. Therefore, it would not be surprising to witness the government spending much time in the first stage.

In fact, we see signs of this. On the nine-item list of demands announced by the PKK militants returning to Turkey, precedence was given to the public unveiling of the text written by Öcalan and examined by the state. The request in this part was for the recognition of Öcalan as a legitimate interlocutor able to talk to the government. The primary objective of Kurdish politics is to make sure Öcalan becomes an interlocutor vis-à-vis the state. Öcalan, responding to the prime minister, who said after demonstrations that took place during the welcoming ceremony, that the government will reconsider the initiative, said no other group would come to Turkey. As such, he tried to show who is in control of the process. In other words, he delivered the message that the government’s initiative will not succeed without his involvement in the process.