This era of politicization in the EU had evolved into a constitutional process by 2003, first through the Constitutional Treaty, which was ultimately “buried” through its rejection by the French and Dutch referenda in 2005, and more recently through the infamous Lisbon Treaty. However, as is known from the events unfolding since this summer, the Lisbon Treaty came with its costs, and it unleashed a series of political crises in the EU, first through the rejection of this treaty in the first Irish referendum and later with the hesitation of the Czech president, Václav Klaus, to sign the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, both obstacles were overcome thanks to the political side-payments paid to those two EU members, just as the liberal inter-governmental approach in European studies would presage, and the Lisbon Treaty finally came into force. The Lisbon Treaty will undoubtedly have an impact on Turkey’s EU accession process through its new clauses; yet, recent developments indicate that one of the new facets of the Lisbon Treaty, an EU president, has already stirred up discussions both in Turkey and in the EU regarding the future of Turkey’s accession process.
The election of Belgium’s incumbent prime minister, Herman Van Rompuy, as the new president of the EU discomfited above all the Turkish side because of Van Rompuy’s notoriously negative views on Turkey’s EU accession |
The election of Belgium’s incumbent prime minister, Herman Van Rompuy, as the new president of the EU discomfited above all the Turkish side because of Van Rompuy’s notoriously negative views on Turkey’s EU accession. Due to his reputation as a politician who remonstrates against Turkey’s EU membership, the election of Van Rompuy has aroused the fear in Turkey that under his presidency, the anti-Turkish Franco-German axis could strengthen its voice, and this would impede Turkey’s EU accession in the near future. This prevailing view in Turkey is, however, a fallacious one, as it inaccurately places a heavy emphasis on the role of the new EU president within the decision-making process.
In order to demonstrate the fallacy of the abovementioned view, one needs to understand the underlying the factors for creating this new position in the EU. Firstly, the European political elites aimed to elect a political figure as the new EU president, so that this figure could neutrally arbitrate between prime ministers/heads of member states in the European Council and help reach a consensus, particularly when contentious issues are on the table. In line with this aim, Article 9B of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that an important role of the EU president is to “facilitate consensus and cohesion within the European Council.” Therefore, regardless of his personal views on Turkey’s EU accession, Van Rompuy is forced to leave his own political views outside the door when wearing the hat of EU president and to act as a neutral broker between member states, when decisions concerning Turkey’s accession process are to be made in the European Council.
The second goal the European political elites aimed to achieve by creating the EU presidential post was to reduce the complexity of decision-making in the EU for European citizens and for high-profile international figures and to create a “popular” single public figure. As is known from a historical anecdote, Henry Kissinger, a former US secretary of state, once asked “whom he could call, if he wanted to talk to Europe.” Up until last week, European political elites had no answer to Kissinger’s question, because there was no single public figure, which represented the entire Union and which Kissinger could directly call. The so-called “Troika,” consisting of the external relations commissioner, the high representative for the common foreign and security policy and the foreign affairs minister of the country holding the rotating presidency, also failed to represent the EU with a single political figure, and despite the Troika, the EU remained a complex decision-making body both for EU citizens and the international arena. Hence, probably Van Rompuy’s most important function will be to answer Kissinger’s question and to help the EU gain a public and popular face both inside and outside the EU.
As seen from the goals for creating the post of EU president, the competencies can never be compared to the powers possessed by the president of the United States. The new EU president will only serve as a neutral broker in the European Council and act as a single figure to create popular recognition for the Union both inside and outside the EU. Contrary to the pervasive fears in Turkey, the new EU president cannot influence the decision-making process in the European Council concerning Turkey’s accession process in the direction of his anti-Turkish political views. Given his constrained powers, it would thus not be mistaken to name the new president of the EU a “shadow” president.
Proponents of this pessimistic view also overlook the fact that the new EU president cannot impair Turkey’s accession process, in conjunction with the Franco-German axis, as long Turkey’s friends in the EU, most notably the United Kingdom and the Central and Eastern European Countries, endorse Turkey’s EU membership. In line with Britain’s policy of a “wider, but not deeper Union,” Britain has from the outset been supporting Turkey’s EU membership and will continue to do so, irrespective of which major political party wins general elections in Britain. Similarly, Poland and the Czech Republic particularly, who possess strong transatlantic ties, follow Britain’s policy of an “enlarged Union” and thus endorse Turkey’s accession to the EU. Since any decision pertaining to the accession process of Turkey requires a unanimity/consensus among the members of the European Council, and since there is a major divide on Turkey’s EU membership between the Franco-German axis and the Atlantic-oriented members, the new president is forced in that case to act neutrally and broker an agreement between both sides, but he is not allowed to affect the outcome with his personal views. If he decides to do the latter, he will clearly be violating the stipulations of his position set out in the Lisbon Treaty.
The election of an anti-Turkish EU president should not be an excuse for Turkey to lose its vigor for EU membership and to fall into torpor in the reform process. We should remember that it is an accession country’s effort spent on reforms that determines the future of its accession process, but not the threats of populist politicians in the EU, who may use the accession process of that country as a campaigning tool for their national electoral campaigns.
*Özgür Erkan, alumnus of the European Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science
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