At that time I was immediately struck by his keen understanding of the importance of culture and civilization for the proper conduct of international relations. Mr. Davutoğlu was definitely not just one more realist foreign policy analyst with a good grounding in the mainstream tradition of Western political thought covering the conceptual ground that connects Machiavelli to Kissinger. This tradition was preoccupied with the management of power, and there is no doubt that Davutoğlu had a sophisticated understanding about how to cope with power and conflict in world politics. Yet what made him more intriguing and distinguished him from many other intelligent interpreters of the changing global scene was his recognition of the significance of non-Western thought as forming an essential basis for the shaping of historically relevant policy to enable a government to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.
Davutoğlu returned to Turkey a few years later, and began teaching university courses. More impressively, he founded a voluntary program of advanced studies for doctoral students in the social sciences and humanities from all over the country. He led this effort by way of a foundation for arts, culture, and science that started in a modest building, but from its outset established an exciting and innovative learning community that combined an intrinsic love of knowledge and ideas with a search for practical wisdom that would enable Turkey to fulfill its potential as a national, regional and global actor. Davutoğlu led this educational effort, emphasizing in the teaching program the importance of history and culture, and what is sometimes called macro-history, or the comparative study of civilizations, examining the broad sweep of the rise and fall of civilizations through time and across space. In this illuminating spirit of inquiry, the role of Turkey was interpreted within a wider cultural and historical context of past, present, and future. Such an approach acted as a corrective to a narrowly conceived nationalism that never looked back further than the ideas and guidance of the founder of the modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
From such a perspective, the interpretation of the place of Turkey in the modern world of the late 20th and early 21st centuries was of preeminent importance. It was Davutoğlu's particular insight that Turkey, in order to move creatively forward into the future, needed to recapture an understanding of and a pride in the achievements of its pre-republican past and especially the extraordinary capacity of the Ottoman Empire to encompass diverse peoples while exhibiting respect for distinct cultures and religions. I found this way of thinking congenial. It represented a refreshing enlargement upon the non-historical forms of strategic thought that seemed so prominent at the time in Turkey, and was almost entirely derivative from the way world politics was conceived in the United States. Davutoğlu as a scholar was striving for an approach that came directly to terms with Turkey's hopes and aspirations for the future, turning to philosophy, culture and history for this deepening of his understanding. In this same spirit, it was his consistent desire to expose students and the intelligent public in Turkey to similar styles of global thinking from other parts of the world. His foundation organized several conferences in the last decade that brought to Turkey leading thinkers from all over the world. Such events exhibited Davutoğlu's commitment to the establishment of a cross-cultural community of scholars dedicated to a universalizing vision of a peaceful and just world.
In his notable scholarly publications, these features of Davutoğlu's thoughts gained attention for his ideas. His book on “strategic depth” as the foundation of a constructive approach to security is one of the outstanding formulations of the way sovereign states should pursue their interests with respect to their region and the world. Although the book is now about 10 years old and is not available in English, it has gone through many printings, and is being translated into a variety of foreign languages. It is one of the most significant contributions to the literature of international relations, and although imprinted with the geopolitics of the Cold War and its globalization sequel, it retains great relevance to the relations of Turkey to an evolving world order. Davutoğlu has expressed frustration that his public duties have prevented him from either revising “Stratejik Derinlik” or following it up with a second book on “cultural depth” that would have given his published work a more accurate reflection of his original approach to international relations in our time.
Against such a background, it may not seem surprising that Davutoğlu has had such a major impact on Turkish foreign policy, initially as chief advisor to the top AK Party leadership, and since May of 2008, as foreign minister. Usually there is not a very good fit between influential professors and successful government service. What has made Davutoğlu an exception is his unusual combination of social and diplomatic skills and an absence of political ambition. Staying aloof from party politics, yet aligned with the AK Party policy outlook, has managed to give him a unique place on the Turkish scene, which is at once independent and yet exceedingly influential with political leaders, with the public, and in foreign capitals.
Even before becoming foreign minister, it was widely appreciated in the media and in the diplomatic community that Davutoğlu has been the architect of Turkish foreign policy ever since the AK Party was elected in 2002. His initial main portfolio involved a focus on achieving Turkish membership in the European Union. It was always Davutoğlu's view that such membership was not only beneficial to Turkey, including establishing a stronger foundation for genuine democracy at home, but also that it presented Europe with a unique opportunity to become a dynamic force in a post-colonial world, enjoying multi-civilizational legitimacy in a world order where the West could no longer play an effective role unless it could claim an identity and recruit the participation of the rising peoples of the East. Although Davutoğlu's hopes for greater European receptivity to Turkey have undoubtedly been disappointed by the unanticipated surge of Islamophobia in several European countries, as well as the unfortunate admission of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, he continues to believe that the goal of Turkish membership is attainable and desirable. This Turkish quest for EU membership continues, with its ups and downs, and has had its own benefits, providing all along strong support for domestic moves to strengthen democracy and human rights in Turkey.
As foreign minister, Davutoğlu has exhibited the qualities of energy, intelligence, political savvy, moral concern, self-confidence (without arrogance) and historically grounded vision that one encounters in his scholarship and lectures. It is hard to think of a world figure that has had a more positive impact in a shorter time. Davutoğlu's signature approach of “zero problems with the neighbors” has been consistently successful in establishing better Turkish relations throughout the region, and challenging a country such as Egypt for regional leadership, even among Arab governments. Less noticed, but as important, is Davutoğlu's tireless search for non-violent approaches to conflict management based on identifying and maximizing the common ground between adversaries. This diplomacy of reconciliation brings an urgently needed stabilizing influence to the inflamed politics of the Middle East, but also brings Turkey respect, stature and expanding economic and diplomatic opportunities in the region and world. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the growing economic links, especially in relation to energy, with both Russia and Iran, countries that have often in the past been at odds with Turkey.
Turkey: an important ally
It is particularly notable that Turkey embarked on these controversial initiatives without harming its strategically central relationship with the United States. Quite the contrary: Turkey is more than ever treated by Washington as an important ally, as exhibited by President Obama's early visit, but to a far greater extent than in the past, Turkey is now also respected as an independent actor with its own agenda and priorities that may diverge from that of the United States in particular instances. It was an expression of this new mutuality that led Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan, to say during his recent visit to Istanbul that it was up to Turkey to decide whether to send additional troops to Afghanistan. This seems like the natural thing to do in the relations among sovereign states, but it contrasted with the heavy-handed approach of the Bush years, where American officials, most prominently Paul Wolfowitz, lectured Turkey in public on their responsibilities to do whatever the White House desired. Of course, this changed atmosphere generally reflects a more multilateralist foreign policy in the United States, but it is also a recognition that Turkey is now an independent force in world affairs, not just an appendage of NATO or the West, which was the case during the Cold War and in the 1990s. Davutoğlu deserves major credit for conceptualizing this change in the perception and treatment of Turkey, as well as through its expression in practical, day to day foreign policy decisions.
It is important to appreciate that Davutoğlu took career risks while serving as chief foreign policy advisor that showed a willingness to put principle ahead of personal ambition. Davutoğlu tried very hard to find and enlarge the common ground and dormant mutual interests in the most intractable, sensitive, and dangerous regional conflict, that of Israel/Palestine and Israel/the Arab world. He did his best to broker Israel/Syria negotiations, encouraging an agreement that would end Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and some kind of diplomatic normalcy between the two countries.
And more controversially, but no less constructively, Davutoğlu tried hard to soften Hamas' posture as an uncompromising and violent element in the Palestinian struggle, and at the same time to encourage Israel to treat Hamas as a political actor, not a terrorist organization, after Hamas gained political power through the 2006 elections in Gaza, and declared its intention to establish, at first unilaterally, a cease-fire. Israel, as well as the United States and the EU, refused to drop the terrorist label, and instead put deadly pressure on the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza. A devastating humanitarian ordeal has resulted in Gaza from this refusal to respect the outcome of the elections, and is continuing with no end in sight. In retrospect, so much suffering might have been avoided if Davutoğlu's approach had succeeded. Additionally, the outlook for peace between the two peoples would have been far brighter than it is today. In this sense, Davutoğlu's foreign policy disappointments during the past several years are as deserving of our admiration as his successes.
There is no doubt in my mind that Turkey is extremely fortunate to have Ahmet Davutoğlu as its foreign minister, and it is a tribute to the elected leadership in Ankara that so much responsibility has been entrusted to someone without party affiliations, of independent character and of scholarly temperament. Much has been made of Davutoğlu's emphasis on “strategic depth,” but I believe he will be in the end most remembered for his “moral depth.” By moral depth, I mean a dedicated concern for seeking peaceful resolution of conflict through mediation and compromise, based on mutual respect for legal rights and a commitment to justice. Although it is far too early in his tenure to make any final appraisal with confidence, it is not too soon to think that fusing strategic depth with moral depth will turn out to be a memorable dimension of Davutoğlu's legacy. If so, it is likely to underpin an eventual judgment that Ahmet Davutoğlu should be regarded as Turkey's finest foreign minister of the Republican era.
*Richard Falk is a professor emeritus of international law and practice at Princeton University and the UN's special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories.