The report, titled "Turkey's Shifting Dynamics," an update of a previous report, was released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which also hosted a press briefing with several of its scholars: Bülent Alirıza, director of the CSIS Turkey Project; Reginald Dale, director of the Transatlantic Media Network; Stephen Flanagan, the Henry A. Kissinger Chair; and Steven Schrage, Scholl Chair in International Business.
"If a more nationalist civilian or military leadership were to emerge in Ankara, this need not necessarily threaten the alliance. Although such governments would be more likely to be isolationist and to focus on perceived internal and external enemies, the relationship would be sustained by enduring common interests. Nevertheless, continuous high-level engagement by US and Turkish officials would be required to prevent disagreements from derailing the relationship. An avowedly Islamist Turkey would severely reduce the extent of cooperation, however, and might even challenge US policies, particularly in the Middle East," says the report.
It also notes in its foreword that "civil-military relations in Turkey are far from the Western model, and the military studiously insulates itself from civil society."
"A major economic downturn would likely stoke nationalist sentiments and could erode democracy. The TGS [the Turkish General Staff] would not seek a role of policy leadership under these circumstances, but it could become even more influential. This would not mean the end of the US-Turkish alliance as more limited cooperation on common interests could probably be sustained," it says. "A new national consensus on how greater religiosity and the secular state can coexist comfortably is not on the horizon, and in the meanwhile, Kemalist ideology will remain the official dogma of the state enshrined in its constitutional order, motivating the TGS and restricting the power of elected governments to act without the necessary and belated redefinition of what exactly it means for the country in the twenty-first century."
CSIS scholars were asked to elaborate whether they believed that there is a risk of the emergence of an Islamist state in Turkey, because the report says that certain "strictures, often called Kemalism, maintained by the Constitutional Court and the TGS, effectively prevent the emergence of an Islamist state in Turkey."
Flanagan said that they were trying to describe the balance of political power within Turkey without taking sides in that debate. "We didn't think that the AK Party's [the ruling Justice and Development Party] agenda was hidden at all," he added.
"I don't think we are going to have an Islamist state in Turkey. I don't think too many people want an Islamist state even if it could be done. I also think the secular system needs to be revised, restructured," Alirıza said.
Obama and a new strategic framework
The report, meanwhile, highlights that "opportunities for enhanced cooperation and restoration of the basic structure of Turkey's Euro-Atlantic relationship exist," and more importantly "these can be found in Turkey's diplomacy with Iran, Iraq, and Syria; moves toward normalization of relations with Armenia; and a continued positive role in the democratization, economic development, and stabilization of the Caucasus and beyond."
CSIS scholars mainly shared their assessments which, they said, they hope "will further dialogue on the renewal of this strategic and increasingly complex relationship" between Turkey and the United States.
According to the scholars, the administration of US President Barack Obama has an opportunity to forge a more strategic relationship with Turkey, one in which both governments find ways to manage lesser differences in order to maintain effective cooperation in the advancement of critical, long-term interests.
"The US-Turkey relationship is increasingly complex and sometimes messy. Fundamental changes and uncertainty in Turkey's domestic situation and neighborhood have altered how Turks perceive and pursue their interests. US global and regional priorities have also shifted since 2001. These differing political and geo-strategic situations will continue to lead the two countries to pursue distinct and sometimes divergent policies, and relations may remain somewhat volatile. Ankara's ‘zero problems' approach to dealing with its neighbors and commitment to dialogue with them will sometimes be problematic for Washington. The question will linger whether Turkey can be counted on to take a tough stance with the United States when more palatable options are exhausted. There will also be times, however, when Turkey's ability to engage independently with some of its nettlesome neighbors can be used to advance mutual interests, as has been the case with Ankara's facilitation of the Syria-Israel indirect talks.
"A new strategic framework for bilateral relations that reflects these evolving geopolitical dynamics and articulates a concrete positive common agenda could help keep relations on course. Such a framework could allow each country to forge common or complementary policies where there is consensus and manage areas where policy preferences or interests diverge. A sustained, high-level dialogue and a more structured process to orchestrate diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation would be a useful mechanism to manage this complexity."
Warning over ‘genocide’ resolution
The report, meanwhile, urges that "rather than seeking [to legislate] history, the United States and the international community provide maximum encouragement and support to the diplomatic rapprochement being pursued by the governments of Turkey and Armenia, as well as to emerging regional cooperation." It warns the US of a harsh reaction from Turkey toward the US over a "presidential proclamation" for recognizing killings of Anatolian Armenians during World War I as genocide as well as over adoption of a congressional resolution for such recognition.
"A near-term uncertainty in the relationship is the ‘Armenian genocide resolution.' If President Obama takes no action to prevent congressional enactment of the resolution, endorses the measure, or uses the word genocide himself, the Turkish response will be harsh and trigger a bitter breach in relations," the report states.
"Creation of a joint Turkish-Armenian commission to explore this painful chapter in history and its continued legacy could also be helpful to that process," it suggests, in apparent reference to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 2005 letter to then-Armenian President Robert Kocharian, inviting him to establish a joint commission of historians and experts from both Turkey and Armenia to study the events of 1915 using documents from the archives of Turkey, Armenia and any other country believed to have played a part in the issue.
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