Geneva conference unlikely to be the last word on Georgian crisis
by
DENNIS SAMMUT*

The original idea for the conference came from French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy to the region at the peak of the crisis in the summer. Whilst everybody then agreed that the priority was to stop the fighting, it was also clear that once that had been achieved the longer and more difficult task of reconstruction had to start. And this was not simply rebuilding the damaged houses and offices, but also rebuilding the fragile relationship between communities in the region.

The convening of the conference was always understood to be on condition that Russian forces would withdraw from Georgian territory except from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians and the Georgians have interpreted this differently. The Georgians have been demanding that the “status quo ante bellum” be restored. This would have meant that they could retake the valleys, gorges and villages in which they had maintained a foothold since they were expelled from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s.

The Russians would have none of that, accusing the Georgians of having used these footholds to launch attacks against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They have therefore interpreted the agreements to mean that they withdraw to the accepted administrative boundaries of the two territories. They did not, as was feared, maintain a “cordon sanitaire” around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and an EU mission has now been deployed to provide assurance that the areas remain demilitarized. So given that the Georgians had lost control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia a long time ago, some argue that in fact very little has changed as a result of the war. This may be true as far as territory is concerned but seismic changes have occurred in the political management of the conflicts in the southern Caucasus, and the Geneva meeting offers the first opportunity to assess the impact of these changes on the region.

A single Russian political act upped the stakes more than their deployment of hundreds of tanks and brigades of soldiers did. This was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Many are still puzzled as to why the Russians decided to play this card so early. They would have surely understood that by doing so they were complicating the situation and narrowing their own room for maneuver. It is very doubtful that the Russians were simply reacting tit-for-tat to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the US and most of Europe. Three reasons closer to home offer more plausible explanations.

Pressure on Saakashvili and government

The first is that by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia the Russians have considerably increased the pressure on Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and his government. After all, these people came to power claiming that they would restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. Now they are seeing two territories not only de facto slipping from their grasp, but soon it may be de jure. Russian action has left Saakashvili’s government politically exposed.

Secondly, as a result of the fact that they now recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states the Russians do not feel that they need the blessing of either the Georgian government or of international organizations to maintain their presence in the two territories. The Russian government now considers this to be simply a bilateral matter. Although some may question this argument as it gives the Russians a teleological narrative.

The third reasons may also be very pragmatic. The Russians are keen to ensure that nothing interferes with the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014. The idea of having instability in Abkhazia, which is only a few kilometers away from Sochi, was always a worrying issue. The new situation allows the Russians to integrate Abkhazia in their Olympic planning.

For a moment the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia put the Geneva meeting in jeopardy. Initially, the Russians insisted on the two entities participating in the conference on an equal level as the Georgians. They subsequently agreed that their participation should be limited to the working groups where participants will be identified only by their names and not by their country. This formula will work for a while but does nothing to resolve the root problems.

The Geneva conference is probably the beginning of a long political process that may very well lead to nowhere. However, it remains important for a number of reasons. It will give the Georgians the opportunity to talk once more to the leaderships of the secessionist states. Many believe that Georgian rhetoric over the last five years has not been conducive to a peaceful solution to the conflicts. Observers are looking for signs of change in this rhetoric and Geneva may be the first opportunity to for them to do so. There are also many day-to-day practical issues that require Georgian officials to talk regularly with their counterparts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, such as the operation of the Inguri power station. It is unlikely that Geneva will focus on these issues but if a semblance of political dialogue emerges from the meeting it will help the process down the line.

Conference a gauge for Russia

The conference may also offer the first sign as to how far the Russians will take the issue of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. So far, Russia is the only state to have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In September, Nicaragua was the second country to recognize them. Nobody doubts that if Russia was in the business of securing the recognition of the two republics by other countries it has enough clout in different parts of the world to ensure that several dozen countries would do so. It may be saving this for a later moment. The Russians have made it clear that there is no going back on recognition. This may be so. But even in the rigid world of international diplomacy their may be creative ways in which Abkhazia and South Ossetia can in the future be restored to nominal Georgian control with everybody saving face. But we are years away from this point, and Geneva may only be the beginning of this process, if at all.

The Geneva conference is also important for the interaction between outside interested powers and international organizations. Some argue that the outright support from the US for Georgia during the August conflict has reduced its ability to play a role in the long-term solution of the crisis. Geneva offers an opportunity for the US to reposition itself, even if ambiguously. It may also offer an opportunity for the US and Russia to clear the air after several weeks of indecorous mud-slinging that reached as far as the chambers of the UN Security Council.

The Georgian crisis has radically changed the position of the EU in the region. Thanks to the determination and energy shown by the French presidency during the summer crisis, the EU is now a leading player. It is a co-host of the conference together with the UN and the OSCE. There are some serious questions about how these two organizations have performed over the years in their task to manage and resolve the Georgian conflicts. For the moment the EU retains the upper hand, and the deployment of several hundred EU observers around the conflict zones ensures that it has a role to play in the future of the region. What happens once the French presidency ends in December is another matter. Will the Czechs, who take over in December, have the will and the ability to maintain a political focus on the problem or will the EU go back to its old ways and leave Georgia to be dealt with by the Brussels bureaucracy?

Ironically Geneva is likely to work least for the restoring of relations between Russia and Georgia. The two sides have in the past reverted to posturing when facing each other in this kind of framework. There are therefore no expectations that the Geneva conference will offer any major breakthrough to the complex problems of the southern Caucasus. It will however be an important venue to test moods and intentions and a first step in the painful process of rebuilding trust between the various local and international players in the region.