Then Michel Sleiman, the former commander-in-chief, was elected president with the support of the majority of members of parliament -- who come from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds -- and he has now, after being sworn in, begun his duty.The newly elected Sleiman got off to a quick start, clearly explaining the attitude he would adopt while in office and enumerating his chief strategies for leading the country out of its current crisis:
* Creating a national peace plan that will put an end to all the political turmoil that has become a recurring problem for Lebanon.
* Putting an end to Israeli interventions, particularly those made into southern Lebanon; forming an international court in regard to the Rafik Al-Hariri assassination; and implementing UN decisions regarding the disarmament of domestic elements.
* Putting an end to the ongoing, mutual problem of not having any diplomatic representation offices with Syria; and establishing embassy-level ties with Syria.
* Lastly, talking to all the related parties about the formation of a national agreement government.
Looking back at the success achieved in Doha, the government crisis that broke out in November 2006 in Lebanon and turned into an armed conflict on May 8, 2008 was alleviated thanks to efforts by the government of Qatar. Even though Qatari Emir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani asserted that the reliance of the Lebanese leaders on reason, wisdom and conscience was the primary motive behind this new conciliation, it is undeniable that Qatar's role has been determinative in the process and that Qatar has remained close with Syria, the US and Iran, which were also concerned about the issue. Undoubtedly, the role played by the local civil society organizations based in Lebanon, which made it clear that further pains associated with internal wars would be unbearable, was also very effective. Within the context of a lasting peace, the following items were brought to the discussion in relation to the Doha agreement: election of a new president, establishment of a national reconciliation government, institution of veto power, which has been promoted by the opposition but denied by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, prohibition of the use of military power as a political weapon by Hezbullah and introduction of reforms to the Election Law as amended in 1960 to identify a new election quota in the capital city of Beirut.
Who wins? Who loses?
The question about whether this agreement represents a fresh start for the Lebanese people, who are seeking a remedy for their recent problems, or only a short break in an ongoing war, was answered by the Lebanese Parliament in the election of the president. The first concrete outcome of the implementation of the articles of the agreement was the election of Sleiman as the new president and the conclusion of an ongoing problem with regard to the presidential election. However, the following points should be taken into consideration when making an assessment of who won in the process that started with Hezbullah's choice to resort to violence and lasted through the Doha agreement:
Undoubtedly, the parties that have lost most in the process are Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Amine Gemayel, representing the Phalangists, and the March 14 movement led by Samir Geagea. Taken all together, this represents the country's ruling power. The primary reasons for this loss are the ruling power's attempt to ask for the resignation of former president Emile Lahud for two consecutive years, making offensive remarks against Amal and Hezbullah forces; its decision to return the weapons to the army; and its cooperation with the US and France.
The Siniora administration, which has close contacts with the March 14 movement, is another party that lost big in the crisis. The administration's retreat from its decision to prohibit use of the communication network developed by Hezbullah two months ago as an alternative to the existing official network and praised in the Winograd Report because of its huge contribution in war time against Israel and the removal of Shiite Wafik Shukair from his position as a security supervisor at Beirut Airport on the grounds that he allegedly left a flight course in the airport under complete Hezbullah control clearly show the magnitude of the erosion of its image.
The question of whether Hezbullah secured some gains in the Doha peace talks is controversial. Even though it managed to take control of its opponents' command control centers; proved its military ability vis-à-vis the March 14 movement that sought to circumvent its political influence in the country; ensured acceptance of its demands by the other parties in the negotiations in Doha; and claimed that it aborted the big conspiracy led by actors seeking to take the country to the edge of collapse in reliance on cooperation with external forces, its actions during the crisis raised serious questions and doubts. Above all, its invasion of the Al-Mustakbal newspaper and television stations affiliated with Hariri, its coercive measures against a number of Sunnis and Druze who were subsequently held by militias as prisoners of war and the growing impression that Iran and Syria were behind this action undermine Hezbullah's image as the sole power that had stood firmly against Israel since 2000.
Undoubtedly, the US administration's image was undermined the most in the crisis. Washington -- which escalated the crisis by instigating the March 8 block that involved Hezbullah, Amal and Michel Aoun and sought to bring Hezbullah down from the level of a regional and international actor that has close relations with Syria, Iran and Hamas to a relatively small local actor lost big in the recent crisis.
Considering the outcome at Doha, we may conclude that Syria was substantially relieved. The decision to shelve implementation of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1559, on disarmament of some local forces, including Hezbullah, and Resolution No. 1701, which calls for the establishment of a specialized international tribunal for the investigation of Hariri's assassination, was a great relief for the Syrian administration. In addition to these recent developments, the acknowledgement of Turkey's role as a mediator between Syria and Israel in resolving the Golan Heights issue will bring great advantages for the Syrian administration.
In conclusion, it should be noted that Hezbullah is facing a great challenge in relation to its abstinence from causing another crisis and prevention of external interventions in the country's domestic affairs. In addition, even though the recent crisis once more demonstrated that sectarian and ethnic identities are still prevalent and that there is still no comprehensive sense of being Lebanese in the country, the parties and actors in domestic politics should realize that nobody can easily break the internal balance in the country and that even the most miniscule intervention with this balance will be detrimental to the safety and security of everyone in the country.
If we look at the point at which the latest developments in Lebanon have reached from our country's perspective, we'll see that Turkey's foreign policy, which has historically opted to stay away from developments in the Middle East and only adopt a Western-oriented perspective, now has a place in a great family picture in which the new Lebanese president is posed between Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora. Looking at this portrait shows the great transformation undertaken in Turkey's foreign policy and to what extent this transformation has been influential.
* Professor Samir Salha is an instructor at Kocaeli University.
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