Turkey hits terrorist targets in Iraq -- what now?
by
O. FARUK LOĞOĞLU*

Background of the strikes

For the past several years, particularly in the last six months, PKK terrorists have been staging attacks in Turkey from their safe haven in Iraq, inflicting substantial losses on Turkish security forces. The Turkish public was getting increasingly restive and angry every time there was one more funeral of a soldier killed in terrorist attacks. The public blamed both the US and the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq for helping the PKK. Public infuriation and frustration turned into an insistent demand from the Turkish government to take action against the PKK presence in Iraq. The Erdoğan government itself was coming under heavy criticism for failing to act. There was a real danger of a deeper rupture in Turkish-US relations, which were already strained for a variety of reasons. Repeated but unfulfilled American assurances and promises over the last four years regarding the PKK in Iraq were the primary source of tension between the countries.    

It was in such a context that a new understanding between the Turkish prime minister and the US president emerged at their meeting in the White House on Nov. 5, 2007. The understanding not only covered the establishment of a new high-level cooperative effort between the militaries of the two countries but, more importantly, also the flow of “actionable intelligence” from US sources to Turkish authorities. These two elements meant that there would be close cooperation on the ground between Turkish and American military forces against PKK terrorists. President Bush’s declaration that the PKK was an “enemy of Turkey, the US and of Iraq” was a significant buttress of the agreement to fight PKK terror. This presidential statement was more than a political one because it also implied an agreement on the US side to fight a common enemy.

The December operations by the Turkish military against PKK targets in Iraq demonstrated that this new understanding was working and producing results. Without intelligence from the US, the operations conducted by Turkey could not have been as precise, timely or effective. Nor could they have been carried out with little or no collateral damage. The recent telephone conversation between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Bush following on their November agreement signals that the cooperation between Turkey and the US against the terrorist PKK’s presence and activities in Iraq will continue.  

Another crucial point to keep in mind is that the US not only provided intelligence but, as the occupying power in Iraq, also opened Iraqi airspace to the Turkish air force, making the Turkish air strike a product of a joint Turkish-US effort. Without a neutral air space, an operation by Turkey could have led to a confrontation with the US in Iraq.  

The meaning of the strikes

For Turkey, the air and ground operations demonstrated first that the Turkish government had the political will to defend and protect national security. Its apparent unwillingness to take action against the PKK in Iraq had been misinterpreted both inside and outside Turkey to mean that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government was not prepared to face the political, diplomatic and economic consequences of a cross-border operation in Iraq. Following Parliament’s October decision authorizing the government to send elements of the armed forces into Iraq, the government took its time in issuing a directive to the armed forces to move against the PKK in Iraq. All these doubts were dispelled, however, on the morning of Dec. 17. The Turkish public was finally relieved to see that the terrorists were being punished.  

The operations also demonstrated the power, capability and skill of the Turkish military. The conventional wisdom had been that the winter season precluded effective military action. The Turkish General Staff organized a variety and combination of operations to prove that they could hit terrorist enclaves in any season, at any time of the day with air or ground forces. This confirmed the fact that the Turkish military is one of the select few in the world that can carry out such operations with effect and accuracy.

For the PKK, the message was clear: Iraq can no longer serve as a safe haven for their presence and activities. The operations and their background, as well as the measured reaction to them, also demonstrated to the PKK that whatever understanding or even support they had enjoyed from the US and Europe was no longer there. This dwindling international sympathy is matched by declining support for the PKK inside Turkey. The PKK will have to draw some important conclusions from this new situation.

For the government of Iraq, the operations meant that Turkey was prepared to and capable of taking matters into its own hands when it came to protecting its national security against terrorists. Notwithstanding a formal note delivered to the Turkish Embassy in Iraq, the Baghdad government could not really contest or dispute the legitimacy of Turkey’s actions as self-defense. Their reaction has been well calibrated.

For the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, the operations spelled the end of their honeymoon with the US. The clear fact that the US was providing real-time intelligence to Turkey and opening Iraqi airspace was proof that the US administration had finally made a difficult choice. The delay in making this choice, incidentally, also accounts in large part for the US failure to act against the PKK ever since its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The choice for the US was not, as is generally suggested, between Turkey and the Kurds in northern Iraq. The choice was between the aspirations of the Iraqi Kurds for independence, on the one hand, and the preservation of the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq, on the other. Once Washington made up its mind in this regard, then it followed that the PKK was an enemy threatening the security, wellbeing and integrity of Iraq that had to be fought. The rather erratic and conflicting statements by Barzani regarding Turkey and the PKK are a reflection of his distaste for and discomfort with the pressure coming from the Americans to tow the US line on PKK terror.

For the EU, the Turkish operations marked a new threshold in their understanding of the difference between what they viewed as the “Kurdish problem” and terrorism. It would be safe to say that the EU countries, as well as EU institutions, are now increasingly realizing that the PKK is not the spokesperson for the “Kurdish problem” and that Turkey has the legitimate right to defend itself against terrorism. Of course, this new outlook is likely to lead to new demands by the EU on Turkey to take additional steps and reforms at an accelerated pace to address the issues related to the Kurds in Turkey. There are already signals toward the same end from Washington.

What now?

After the operations, the pendulum has swung away from the PKK and its sympathizers toward the side of the Turkish government. This creates a window of opportunity for the Turkish government and society to address some of the issues that the terrorists abuse to make a case for their actions. Now there are certain critical tasks that must be taken up by the political authorities in Turkey with regard to terrorism and its proximate causes.  

One task is to engage in sustained public diplomacy to ensure that international public opinion remains favorable -- or at least not opposed -- to Turkey as it continues to attack terrorist targets in Iraq.  This requires sharing with the international community information about Turkey’s actions, intentions and its reasons for fighting PKK terrorism.

Another important point for Turkey is to not overdo things in Iraq. Our military authorities are the best judges of whether further strikes are needed, because they have all the intelligence and data. However, there is the question of diminishing returns and creating a feeling of fatigue in public opinion. The Turkish General Staff chose the best time to commence their strikes and they should again choose the best time to stop them.    

However, the most important task for Turkey is to seize this current window of opportunity to tackle the web of issues raised by its Kurdish population. Fighting terrorists by military means will and must continue until the PKK terrorists publicly denounce terror, lay down their arms and deliver themselves to a court of law. However, the military component will always be only part of the answer to terrorism, never the whole answer to terrorism. The same applies to any version of amnesty for the PKK terrorists. That too is only a limited part of any approach to combating terrorism and its root causes.

We need all these various elements in our combined effort to defeat terrorism. Every step, big or small, counts -- so long as these steps constitute parts of a greater whole. In this connection it is, for example, just as important to bring terrorists home as it is to prevent new recruits from joining the organization. However, what we must do without any further delay or procrastination is develop a societal project with the participation and consensus of all segments and sectors of the Turkish population. The government should initiate the process by putting forward elements of a comprehensive strategy to address all the issues deemed relevant to terrorism in Turkey. This strategy must reflect the views and contributions of the various parts of the state apparatus, both civil and military. Then civil society should debate the strategy. The universities, think tanks, the media and citizens ought to have avenues for making their views known on this societal project. Once the civil debate is closed, the government must rework the strategy and take the project to Parliament for approval. The discussions in Parliament must end with a broad consensus and enjoy the support of all the political parties represented there. The project that emerges from this work must then be made public, with precise timelines and guidelines as to its implementation.

One could argue that the societal project is too difficult and too unrealistic to realize, pointing out that existing views and emotions on these matters are too different to reconcile. This is probably all true. Yet what is the alternative? The cost of the alternative is prohibitively high. Terror is one of the black holes that are sapping Turkey’s moral, intellectual and material energies. The recent cross-border operations have prepared the ground for a possible final solution to PKK terror in Turkey. Let us not miss the opportunity.