Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia, currently observers, are lobbying hard to get accepted into this club. The US request for membership was rejected two years ago. A number of American scholars view the SCO as a challenge to Western interests. It has been described as an enigma, a security organization, a regional forum, an anti-terrorism coalition, and as a Russian and Chinese-led alliance created to counter US hegemony. Some have described it as the beginning of a new Warsaw Pact-type organization (or a “NATO of the East”). It seems that the SCO is set to play a major role in the emerging geo-political fault lines in the region, and indeed, in the world. At the most recent Aug. 16 SCO summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, a number of important agenda items were discussed and the leaders agreed on some key actions. On Aug. 17, the six SCO leaders flew to Russia’s Chelyabinsk region to watch the closing stage of the SCO’s “Peace Mission-2007” counterterrorism exercises, which have been under way since Aug. 9. SCO countries cooperate in other spheres, including cultural, communications, economics, banking, drug-trafficking and judicial matters. But it is the SCO’s growing cooperation in the military and energy sphere that has made some non-SCO countries apprehensive. The most significant outcome from the Bishkek summit was a new step taken toward creating a regional energy club within the SCO pursuant to a proposal last year by Russian President Putin. Energy-related agreements have already been signed by individual states on the sidelines. Kazakh President Nazarbayev has championed the proposal this year and also asked for a unified energy infrastructure among the member states.
“The draft Asian energy strategy envisions the establishment of an SCO Energy Agency, which would be a type of ‘brain center’ and database, while transactions on the market for energy resources could be made through an SCO energy bourse,” Nazarbayev said. He believes that forming an oil and gas club was one of the pivotal ideas for the SCO, as the existing pipeline system linking Russia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and China, could serve as a basis for establishing a uniform SCO market. Russian President Putin added his voice to the creation of an energy club and stressed that expanding fuel trade cooperation could give an impetus to regional projects. “I am sure that the initiated energy dialogue and accompanying national energy strategies, as well as the establishment of an energy club, will set the priorities for our further cooperation,” he said. At the talks in Bishkek as an observer, Iranian President Ahmadinejad too came up with a proposal to hold a meeting of SCO energy ministers in Tehran “to optimize cooperation in transportation, prospecting, development and refining.”
SCO at a glance
Originally known as the Shanghai Five, the SCO was officially formed six years ago as an attempt for regional leaders to gather together and improve political and military cooperation. Besides Russia and Kazakhstan, the SCO comprises China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and has Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia as observers. So far, it was seen largely as a talking shop summit, without any tangible agreements or developments. Although its founding declaration says the bloc is not directed against other states, one of its original aims is seen as serving as a counterbalance to US power and to reduce American influence in energy-rich Central Asia. The latter was evident in Uzbekistan’s closure of a US air base in July 2005 and in Kyrgyzstan’s demand that the US raise the price it pays for the use of its Manas air base -- from $2mn to $200mn a year. In 2005, the US applied to join the bloc, but was rejected. The SCO is mainly focused on its Central Asian members’ security-related concerns, namely the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. In 2004, the SCO established the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and in 2006, it announced plans to fight cross-border drug crime as part of its wider counter-terrorism efforts.
The enlargement of the SCO was intensely discussed in Bishkek as there are differing views on its future direction and mission. Moscow wants India in the SCO as a member but may have to pay China’s price, which would be membership for Pakistan. This extension of membership raises the possibility of two members of the same collective security organization who are still waging a proxy war against each other. Arguably, such an extension could only be accommodated by removing the SCO even further from a military role because it would then be hamstrung from the outset in responding to any kind of serious military or even terrorist threat.
Iran’s future role in the SCO seems to be a serious problem for members because it would then appear as if they support Iran’s nuclear program and could be called upon to defend it, e.g., against the insurgents operating inside Iran who are widely reported to be backed by Washington, or even more importantly against a direct American attack on Iran. Certainly Iran has long argued and lobbied for its membership in the SCO. Yet, its accession to the regional club is unlikely in the short to medium term. Although there is some support for Iranian inclusion from Russia, China has shown itself to be considerably cooler to the prospect, unwilling to strain relations with the US. With the threat of more stringent international sanctions against the Islamic Republic over its nuclear development program growing, the strategic importance of Iran’s neighbors also increases. However, for the Central Asian states, markedly weaker than Russia and China, embracing Iran’s hand for deeper relations will need some convincing.
Will Turkmenistan join?
The Bishkek meeting was the first for a Turkmen leader to attend a SCO summit. After years of isolationist policy under the rule of President Niyazov, who died last year, new leader Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has softened some of his predecessor’s iron-fist policies, increasingly opening up its economy to the outside world. He recently signed gas pipeline deals with Russia and China. The decision to take part in the meeting as an “honored guest” follows a recent improvement in Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia. So far, however, Turkmenistan has not signaled that it has plans to join the SCO in any capacity.
Both Moscow and Beijing have been urging Turkmenistan to forsake its previous neutrality and join the organization. Although Turkmenistan clearly wants to retain a tie to Washington, its new leadership is no less clearly committed to a more active and engaged multi-directional foreign policy and may well seize the opportunity to strengthen its regional affiliations as well as its ties to Moscow and Beijing by joining the SCO. Doing so would formally end its neutrality, but it is unclear how Turkmen membership might modify the basic rules and conditions of membership in the organization, unless Moscow is able to turn it, as it sought to do in 2006, into an energy club. This last goal may well be another manifestation of Russia’s effort to galvanize practical outcomes in the SCO especially as it is working hard to set up a gas cartel in the Commonwealth of Independent States under its auspices and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would be main producers in such a cartel.
Further testament to growing interest in the SCO meetings is the fact that this year’s summit brought together the largest non-member international representation to Bishkek. In addition to Ahmedinejad, Mongolian President Enkhbayar, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora attended as observers, while Berdymukhammedov, Afghan President Karzai and UN Deputy Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe were guests of honor.
Where will the SCO head?
This latest meeting SCO took place against the backdrop of a changing regional as well as international geo-political context. Both Russia and China are keen to develop a more muscular foreign policy position, buoyed by their economic might. Over time, the SCO has morphed from a security grouping to a more important economic and political organization for each of the member states to press their agenda in the region.
The SCO has previously been seen as a tool for Russia and China to blunt growing US influence in the region, as well as provide a forum for the historic protagonists to resolve their differences as they jockey for position in Central Asia. Although this is still the case, the SCO is evolving in a way that could see it play a major role in the development, including production, transit, and export, of Central Asia’s oil and gas resources. “Reliable and mutually beneficial partnership in various energy spheres will contribute to security and stability in the SCO region and in a global dimension,” the SCO said in a joint statement.
The key dimension of the SCO remains the Sino-Russian relationship. China and Russia have developed increasingly close relations, sharing a common resentment of the West’s global dominance and its tendency to interfere in what they regard as “internal affairs.” However, competing interests in the region and historic mistrust suggest that the role of the SCO will be limited in the medium term. Despite the recent warming in relations and shared fears of US “encirclement,” the two countries’ ties with the US will remain their most important bilateral relationship.
Chinese writings emphasize the SCO’s political and economic component as a forum for building security and its potential to be a model for an international organization promoting a new multilateralism in Asia from which Washington would be absent. Russia appears to emphasize the SCO’s potential to be a hard security and military organization that would revolve around a Russian agenda as part of a new international solar system revolving around Moscow.
Whereas Beijing emphasizes the SCO’s utility as a vehicle for coordination on soft security and economics (which includes anti-terrorist activities short of conflict), Russia apparently sees or hopes to see the organization as a military alliance in some way susceptible to its agenda. Yet Russia’s hopes of achieving this outcome have not been realized until now because of the opposition of China and the Central Asian states to a military bloc. They prefer an organization whose main purpose is anti-terrorism and economic cooperation and are ultimately suspicious of being included in any bloc, particularly one identified as being openly anti-American.
Outlook and implications for Turkey
The talks which take place behind the scenes at SCO summits should be decidedly more interesting. Some analysts question how solid the ties are that bind the SCO members and others question whether the organization is useful to all of its members. “Is the SCO the ‘rising beast in the East’ -- an Asian counter to NATO?” has no clear answer yet, but no doubt the SCO is to continue growing in terms of membership and influence in Asia and the wider world. Within the SCO dimensions are shifting, with security still the central aim, but increased economic and political cooperation also gaining momentum. The oil- and gas-rich region is aware of its strategic resources, and SCO members are keen on increasing ties in these sectors. It also seems likely that serious cracks in the organization will become more visible at the same time. The SCO now is coming unwound because in the military sphere the SCO has competition from the CSTO (the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty Organization) and -- in the economic sphere -- also the SCO has competition from the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Hence, the SCO needs to propose something new and useful to interest the countries of Central Asia.
Until now the SCO has remained rather elusive in terms of its practical accomplishments other than being a forum for the discussion of issues of common concern and for Russo-Chinese efforts to use it, each in their own way, as an alternative form of international organization. Certainly if the membership expands to include Turkmenistan, Iran, India and Pakistan, the nature of the SCO would undergo a serious qualitative change and stimulate new dynamics in the endlessly unfolding “new great game” for access and influence in Central Asia.
As such, it is fair to say that this year’s SCO summit turned out to be much more eventful that past summits, and proved to be a milestone in its effort to become a new or alternative type of international organization. Kazakhstan plays a key role in the SCO, particularly in reconciling Russia and China, which often differ in their approaches regarding the future direction, role and enlargement of the organization. SCO Secretary-General is Bolat Nurgaliev, former Kazakh ambassador to Japan.
Given that the SCO is set to play a key future role in this region, Turkey will have to keep a watchful eye on its activities, particularly on how the proposed Energy Club will evolve, and the new security architecture taking shape in Eurasia in light of Ankara’s expanding energy, trade, investment and security ties with Russia, China and Central Asian countries.
*Mehmet Öğütçü is Forum İstanbul vice-chairman and former head of OECD Global Forum on International Investment, in London and he can be reached at ogutcudunya@yahoo.co.uk