The alliance has been beneficial for both sides in different ways, which is why it has continued. However, the Turkish-US alliance is today at its most difficult point since the 1947 Truman Doctrine. It was for the US, as much as it was for Turkey, a turning point when then-US President Harry S. Truman stood before Congress on March 12, 1947 and delivered an historic message that stressed the importance of support and protection for Turkey and Greece against the Soviet threat. When in the immediate wake of World War II the Soviet Union demanded the right to place its soldiers on the straits of Turkey (Bosporus and Çanakkale) and to take land from eastern Anatolia, Turkey faced a new, real, concrete and life-threatening danger. Thus what the Truman Doctrine offered to Ankara, which was experiencing very difficult conditions at the time, was critical support.
Until then the concept of alliances had been foreign to US tradition in international relations. In the past the US had tended to regard the spread of Soviet power from a strictly geographical perspective. Washington’s primary concern was focused on Turkey’s straits. Turkey’s eastern regions, in fact even the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, were overshadowed by the strategic importance of these straits. Despite this narrow geo-strategic perspective, which continued almost until the start of the 1950s, the Truman Doctrine heralded the first step towards radical changes in traditional US policies. From that date onward the US, as it began to shoulder responsibilities on a world level, started down the road toward becoming a superpower.
Although the Truman Doctrine offered Turkey important support it did not quite satisfy Ankara. The Turkish capital was looking for an alliance that would promise even stronger security. After NATO was formed, Turkey began to see this very one-sided Western military alliance of nations as offering the strongest security possible and duly began to push with perseverance for membership. It was at this time that Turkey moved to a multiparty regime and, in order to show its belief in the Western alliance of nations, it sent soldiers to Korea. Finally in 1952 with the strong and decisive support of the US -- and in the face of opposition from many of the founding nations -- Turkey joined NATO.
After Turkey became a NATO member its relations with the US began to develop further. It was able to benefit from the advantages of a multinational military alliance as a deterrent against the Soviet threat. At the same time the Turkish Armed Forces underwent a modernization process and, during the Cold War years, our contributions to NATO were great. By devoting up to 30 divisions to the area under the Soviet/Warsaw Pact, the Turkish Armed Forces greatly relieved the pressure presented by the Soviet military over the middle front of the NATO alliance centered in Germany. And the control over the straits guaranteed an unshakeable 1,500-kilometer NATO defense line over the Mediterranean -- spreading all the way down to Sicily. In addition Turkey allocated military bases and facilities for the use of NATO and the US. In short the benefits of the alliance were felt on all sides, not just in Ankara. Beyond this the new NATO alliance ensured that Turkey would continue to be the most functional regional tie to the West long after the Cold War was over.
Within NATO though, Turkish-US relations were not entirely flawless. On the contrary the relations between the countries sometimes produced problems. For example Turkey was unable to fully embrace the Middle East policies of the US. It was natural that Turkey would have its own particular interests and problems when it came to relations with neighboring countries. The US was opposed to NATO attempts to expand into a shape which would include the Middle East and the Gulf of Basra in its ring of responsibilities. It fostered, in addition to its Soviet deterrent policies, a policy of trying to extend subtle messages of reassurance to Moscow rather than trying to openly frighten or scare the Soviet capital.This two-pronged policy from Washington occasionally brought the US and NATO to loggerheads. Within this framework Ankara did not accept a single project aimed at updating the short-range nuclear missiles based in Turkey. In addition the difficult relations between Turkey and Greece, as well as the continuing Cyprus problems, also managed to affect Turkey’s relations with both NATO and the US.
Besides all these other issues, Turkish-US relations faced three serious crises during the Cold War years. One of these was that, during the 1962 Cuba crisis, midrange Jupiter missiles that had been placed on Turkish soil at the Cigli air base were removed following bargaining between the White House and the Kremlin. This in turn caused Ankara to enter into a crisis of trust with regards to the US. Another crisis that caused even deeper disappointment on the part of Ankara was the infamous 1964 Johnson letter. The third crisis came about with the passage of an arms embargo against Turkey by the US Congress in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus movement. The embargo was lifted in 1978, but after that the near-annual “genocide” bills brought before Congress by Armenian lobby groups perpetuated this tension.
Turkey-US relations have never affected Turkish public opinion as negatively as they do now. The US has never experienced as great a loss of respect in the eyes of the Turkish public as it currently does. This phenomenon is one that has emerged in the wake of Sept. 11, the US invasion of Iraq and US Middle East policies in general. The neocon perspective on Islam; an outward stance that ignores religious sensitivities; an inability to cease the ongoing violence in Iraq; the failure to take appropriate precautions against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) presence in northern Iraq; and the discounting of Turkey’s various interests in Iraq: all of these are factors which have worked to poison Turkey’s relations with the US. As for the US side of matters, it also appears that certain politicians -- in particular those with military ties -- have not been able to rise above the desire for revenge in the wake of the shock resulting from the Turkish Parliament’s infamous March 1, 2003 decision.
Despite the generally dark tableau presented here, the two allies can not break apart from one another. Their alliance continues. As a NATO member Turkey is providing support to the US in Afghanistan. A full 60 percent of equipment support for US soldiers in Iraq comes through Turkey. The İncirlik Air Force base in Adana provides support for the US efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Başer-Ralston cooperation (against PKK forces in northern Iraq) still continues. The US, which understands Turkey’s importance more than any other nation in the post-Cold War world, does not limit itself simply to expressing support for US membership in the European Union, it is working actively on this front. In the meantime the implementation of the F-35 jet project, which will bring the latest in airplane technology to Turkey, has begun.
It would be incorrect to view Turkish-US relations from only one angle. This relationship has always been a problematic one and it is a fact that the problems faced nowadays are more serious than ever. But the alliance continues, in different shapes and forms. What needs to be focused on now is the search for ways to develop economic relations. An increase in the variety and type of economic ties, as well as between aspects of civil society between these two countries, would reduce pressure on strategic relations and would help in the overcoming of any crises which might occur in the future.
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