This incident created an opportunity to move forward because it brought the dispersed PKK forces, which had many leaders, around a single actor. Otherwise, the only strategy the state had was armed conflict, and it was clear that this wasn’t going to yield any results. By keeping Öcalan in Turkey, there was a natural creation of a reference that could direct PKK powers, an actor that the Turkish authorities could speak to when necessary and a person who could be addressed in the problem. Maybe the Americans knew that they were opening up the path towards a solution when handing over Öcalan to Turkey.But this process did not unfold smoothly. The military determined that eliminating the PKK was the way to solve the Kurdish issue, but they were not able to fulfill this goal. In their eyes “speaking” with Öcalan was a confirmation of failure and an acceptance of defeat. Networks that benefited from the conflict and wanted it to continue had formed within the army, and the fragmented PKK structure was a situation they preferred. It is for this reason the military officers prevented any solution process that implied involving Öcalan. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) backed this policy. These two political parties supported the military both because it was compatible with their own nationalist ideologies and because they didn’t want the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to solve the problem.
The AK Party became isolated, and during its first term in government it shied away from taking steps to solve the problem. The AK Party government thought they were up against a process they could not manage, and so they chose to wait. But then an unexpected development took place during their second term in office. It was discovered that the army had made at least four coup attempts in the last six years, and the prosecutor’s office decided to crack down on this organization for the first time. Aside from its legal effects, this development had even more important psychological and political effects.
According to a survey conducted nationwide last week by MetroPOLL, the number of people who believe the most recent events and debates have damaged the army’s prestige is three times more than those who say they have improved it. In other words, society’s “sentimental” connection to the military is on the decline, while a more objective approach is on the rise. This process has reassured the government in terms of politics because it has given it the opportunity to create new strategies in domestic policy. The discovery of covert plans led us to an environment that made the Kurdish initiative possible. After TRT-6, the government allowed private radio and television stations as well to broadcast in Kurdish. It became possible for prisoners and convicts to speak in Kurdish with their relatives. Universities were given permission to set up Kurdish institutes and research centers. A notice was issued this week on easing certain restrictions, enabling families in the Southeast to go to the highlands and revive cattle breeding in the area again. Moreover, legislation on preventing discrimination is being referred to Parliament and proposals are being made on ratifying UN protocols.
Can we say we are headed towards solving the Kurdish issue? Not just yet because this issue requires the will of not only the government but of Kurdish politics as well. But Öcalan and the PKK are not in favor of supporting any solution that does not address them directly. The day the interior minister announced that new steps would be taken, Kurdish politicians launched a campaign refusing to have any meeting with the government until Öcalan’s prison conditions were improved. In other words, Öcalan was saying, “I don’t support improving the living conditions of Kurds until my own conditions are improved.”
As for the government, it has an incorrect notion that it can solve the problem without Öcalan. The government is blocking its own path in an environment where it is possible to implement the initiative. Moreover, there is no longer a need to directly address Öcalan. Even though the factuality of the newly founded Peace and Democracy Party’s (BDP) decision to return to Parliament and engage in “Turkey’s politics” is debatable, it does point to a new intention and a new strategy. This means that it will become possible to discuss the Kurdish issue in Parliament.
The government needs to properly assess this opportunity and take this critical step because there are signs that the coup-instigating and coup-supporting coalition had suggested that the PKK cooperate with them in removing the AK Party from power. The desire to consolidate their hegemony over Kurdish politics could propel the PKK to form a coalition with coup supporters. It appears that the Kurdish issue is turning more into a clash of mentalities than just being a Turkish-Kurdish conflict.