Turkey in 2010: confrontation or normalization?

More importantly, President Gül added that what some interpret as a confrontation between “institutions”, i.e., the armed forces and the judiciary on the one hand and elected officials on the other, is a “process of normalization.” What does this mean in the context of Turkish politics today? It clearly refers to the rule of law: No one, civilian or military, is above the law. Given the fast pace of recent events and the deep confusion surrounding them, normalization is the key word, a word that may shape Turkish politics in 2010.

Having gone through numerous hard and soft coups and countless political machinations to advance illegal and anti-constitutional agendas, Turkey does indeed need a process of normalization. Politics need to be run as politics, constitutional institutions must act within their limits and the rule of law should be upheld by everyone. This is the only way Turkey will resolve its decades-old problems including the Kurdish and Alevi issues and the rights of religious minorities. It is only through the rule of law, accountability and transparency that Turkish citizens can believe in a democratic system and reject military coups and other illegal interventions into politics.

But can Turkey secure its democracy and further mature it with its current legal system and constitution? Certainly not. The current Turkish Constitution was drafted by a group of generals who carried out the 1980 military coup in order to create a tutelary political system. It was designed to maintain the 1980 status quo, and it did so for two decades. It was flawed from the very beginning. Now it has become a real burden on Turkish democracy.

The reason is that the legal and political reforms that the AK Party government is expected to pass can easily be blocked by the current Constitution. As a matter of fact, some reforms and new legislation, required by EU standards as well, have been vetoed by the judiciary and the Constitutional Court on the basis of certain clauses in the Constitution. Even privatization has hit the hard wall of the 1980 Constitution. To further complicate the issue, the vast majority of the Turkish judiciary has a very narrow and illiberal interpretation of the law. It sees itself as the guardian of the state and the status quo rather than the law and liberties. One can mention numerous examples, from the charges brought against such Turkish intellectuals as Hrant Dink, Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak to the closure case against the AK Party. The most recent case was the closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The pattern is the same: Protect the status quo established by the 1980 Constitution in the name of maintaining order.

It is this legal and ideological wall that prevents the government from acting with greater boldness and determination regarding the Kurdish issue. This may sound like a joke to an outsider, but even the few small steps the Erdoğan government has taken so far to address the Kurdish issue can be used as a basis for another closure case against the AK Party. For instance, a judge can interpret the teaching of Kurdish language in universities and the opening of Kurdish research institutes as violating the first three articles of the Constitution, which define the character of the Turkish state and society. I am afraid the government will face similar problems with the Alevi issue. And I wouldn’t be surprised if some judges opposed the opening of the Halki Seminary, the only Greek Orthodox religious school in Turkey, closed since 1971, on the basis of some weird article in Turkish law.