And the shutting down of parties is an indicator of how incompetent the state ideology is in governing the nation. Encountering difficulty in adjusting to a changing world, with the entry of new criteria into politics as an extension of democracy, and Turkish societal dynamics, Kemalism has left the state in a tough spot. A series of “guardian” laws -- from the law defending Atatürk to that about “the state’s indivisible integrity” -- are in place to protect the regime.The only trial that ended in a decision that contradicted the high court’s ideological views was the one related to the closure of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party); in that case the court made a “political” decision. In other words, from the perspective of the Constitutional Court, the word “political” means an exit from the bounds of the Kemalist ideology. Thus, the DTP case shows us that there has been a return to the old ideological position. And with regard to the position at hand, legalism has never been important. The court made its own decision fit with the law in its own way.
For this reason, the opinion that this last decision will end the process of democratization in Turkey seems rather exaggerated. Turkey is democratizing despite the judiciary and military, and as has been seen with the happenings surrounding the Ergenekon trial, the judiciary’s resistance is ongoing. On the other hand, it’s also difficult to say that the Constitutional Court’s decision is entirely ideological, because there really are organic ties between the DTP and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and more importantly, some DTP administrators openly do politics based on these ties. As for the DTP’s discourse, for years it resembled a pendulum. On the one hand a call for peace was made, and on the other it supported the PKK’s existence as an armed force. Also, it mustn’t be forgotten that the trial in question had to do not with the DTP’s present, but with issues from before 2007, because the hybrid appearance of the DTP’s discourse was also a positive development of the latest period. When pre-2007 comes into the picture, we must accept that the DTP’s connection with the PKK was much more conspicuous.
In Turkey, the expectation that the Constitutional Court operates as a strong power in the way of justice and freedom is relatively new. In other words, even if there were many who expect today’s court to make a more “political” decision to protect democracy, this is itself a result of Turkey’s democratization.
The current scene, along with the DTP’s closure, has the potential to create two results, one short and one long term. In the short term, we can predict that it will increase distrust on the part of Kurds, decrease possibilities for their dialogue with the government, and increase the PKK’s hegemonic influence on Kurdish society. But there’s no chance that this situation will last very long because above all, Kurds are now overall a bit less partisan to the PKK, ideologically speaking. No matter how very difficult it is to oppose the organization politically, it’s also that difficult to approve of them ideologically. Today’s Kurdish society is heavy with a more democratic Kurdish politic, and this is going to meet up with the expectation of those segments of society who await a “politically” libertarian decision from the Constitutional Court.
Ultimately, the DTP’s closure may lead to the birth of a confident Kurdish movement that will for the first time be able to distance itself from the PKK. In the past the closure of Kurdish parties always paved the way for the opening of new parties that were all the same, but this time the conditions at hand and the government’s stance make it possible for a different political understanding to emerge. The DTP was a balancing party, a coalition of sorts, and when critical moments arrived it always drew close to the PKK. Now we’re in possession of the conditions that could establish a party able to behave differently. The PKK is probably also aware of this, and it will from day one want to take the new party under its strict control. But there’s a possibility -- and not a small possibility -- that this stance will increase the distance between wide segments of Kurds and the PKK, and lead towards alienation.
The past few years have seen a cultural renaissance in the Southeast. Demand for democracy is ongoing with a quest for democratic politics, and this quest is being conducted by a new generation acquainted with Kurdish culture. What remains in the PKK’s hands are the youths known as the ‘90s generation. It’s wishful thinking that amidst an ongoing dynamic toward peace that extends to the Middle East, the demands of the Kurds will be achieved by this sort of violent movement. The disappointment in the Kurdish political arena created by the DTP’s closure will also lead to a personal disappointment within Kurdish society, and it seems possible that this has the potential to lead to a Kurdish movement that rejects violence.
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