Homework for The New York Times

It came as a less of a surprise to me. The quality of the reporting in general on Turkey by The New York Times has declined lately, particularly since its hardworking and knowledgeable reporter, Sabrina Tavernise, was dispatched elsewhere.

Intense care and meticulousness to understand and convey the complexities of Turkey to the international reader left its place to simplistic, partial and sloppy reporting. The coverage, for example, of the tax evasion case of the powerful Doğan Media Group was a journalistic disaster, so full of oversimplifications and distortions on the state of journalism in Turkey that one wondered whether the editors back home in New York had left for an extended vacation.

The latest story, signed by Dan Bilefsky, on the Ergenekon case, makes for a similar reading, leaving a bitter taste. When a reporter is sent to a country he or she has no clue about, and is deliberately misled, the result often edges toward propaganda, for this or that cause. Facts are twisted and, with a shallow analysis, the poor reader is misled, too.

The story smells badly of a homework assignment ignored. It describes a Turkey experiencing widespread fear and anxiety because the “Islamic-inspired” government may be “exaggerating” the threat of a coup. Its formulations are done as if to suit those “fears.” Take this, for example: “The case has brought into relief the larger strains in Turkey between a secular elite seeking to hold on to its waning influence and a growing, increasingly assertive population of observant Muslims. The case is being watched closely in Brussels, headquarters of the European Union, as a barometer of Turkey’s adherence to Western standards of justice. It comes as the country’s prospects for joining the bloc seem to be diminishing.”

One may blame the reporter for being manipulated into twisting the truth. But an editor should warn him that the European Commission takes the Ergenekon case very, very seriously (as it now does the latest report on the clandestine military plan, called “Cage”) although it is very clear and nuanced on its critique over proceedings.

The story’s bias is clearly visible by an almost complete lack of sources who would be able to explain the real content of the case and others who are hopeful about its outcome. The reporter obviously did not bother to speak to the lawyers of the assassinated Hrant Dink’s family, or for example, Akın Birdal, a human rights activist (now a deputy of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party [DTP]), who barely survived with 10 bullets in his body (the perpetrators are members of Ergenekon).

Since this unfortunate story shines with its lack of the question “why?” I will suffice to ask some of the questions to the reporter, with the hope that when he addresses the subject he may do justice to his readers and no longer insult the highly experienced and deeply scarred journalists of this country.

Why do the opinion polls suggest that the majority of people here believe that there is a “lethal deep state” within the state? Why are the liberal, socialist, democratic, Kurdish, non-Muslim, and “silent” Sunnis and Alevis segments of society so supportive of the investigation? How many people have been subjected to investigation and interrogation so far? How many have been detained?

What are the arguments of lawyers such as Ergin Cinmen or Kezban Hatemi or Sezgin Tanrıkulu, or other human rights lawyers, about the significance of the case?

How do you measure a “wide net of mistrust??” How wide is it? What is the common denominator of those who mistrust? How do they define themselves? Is the mistrust false or disguising something else?

If Ergenekon case is -- almost -- false and fictitious, why, then, do independent and staunchly secular papers such as Taraf continue to uncover, segment after segment, plans and subversive structures within the army? Are they stupid?

If Ergenekon is a tool for the government to impose Islamic rule by silencing the opposition, why, then there is a “wide net of hope” among those who would not vote for it?

Assume that prosecutors are politicized. There are some 40 independent judges supervising the case. They are randomly chosen for duty. If the detentions are unjustified, wrong or too long; are the judges all biased? Are they all idiots or lackeys?

Finally, this question: Ergenekon, without a doubt, a mafia-like network, that is yet to be exposed. How did the judicial system in the US fight organized crime, what were the proceedings, how long were the detentions?