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It has become clear that the statements Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Chairman Onur Öymen made about the Dersim massacre were not a slip of the tongue but a revelation of his thoughts. As everyone knows, Öymen’s real business is diplomacy. In other words, he comes from a tradition of weighing his sentences several times before he utters them and hiding his messages in between the lines.
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Saying whatever comes to his mind is against Öymen’s diplomatic identity. After all, he never did take a step back in any of his subsequent speeches, and just recently he said sentences to the effect of “that is what Atatürk did. If you have the courage then says something about him.” If Öymen were the only person with this kind of dogmatic mental structure then it would be tolerable to a certain degree. We could make sense of the event saying, “There is a Zhirinovsky in every society.” But that is not possible in this case. Öymen’s words were critical words reflecting the CHP’s approach to problems. He was elaborating the stance adopted by the CHP regarding the democratic initiative. If these words belonged solely to a single diplomat you could throw the blame on someone else and solve the problem, but that is not possible in this case. The CHP and its leader, Deniz Baykal, essentially share the same views. They are basically saying: “A problem cannot be solved with a democratic initiative or anything like that. Planes should drop bombs in the Southeast. Those who die will die; those who survive will learn their place and come to their senses.” According to the CHP mentality expressed by Öymen, the state always has an iron hand, and everyone must kiss that hand. That is how it was in 1937 and that is how it is today. There is a particular detail in the “filthy document” undersigned by Col. Dursun Çiçek that was not subject to much debate. Although the document is popularly known as the “plot to finish off the Justice and Development Party [AK Party] and [Fethullah] Gülen movement,” an important piece of information was not given due attention. Provoking an Alevi-Sunni conflict was an important detail in the plan. In other words, the aim in the action plan was to bring about the same arguments in Turkey. Remember that the unrest necessary to stage the Sept. 12 coup d’état was created by inciting the Alevi-Sunni conflict. Hundreds of Alevis and Sunnis were killed in incidents in Kahramanmaraş, Çorum, Sivas and Malatya that have yet to be solved. The Sept. 12 coup was mainly created by provoking the Alevi-Sunni conflict. Of course, the games being played through provoking Alevis did not end with a coup. Whenever disorder was needed in the country similar scenarios were repeated. Alevis were always the main victims in these scenarios as well. Many people suffered in the Madımak provocation that took place on July 3, 1993. Then in an incident that was later included in the Ergenekon indictment three coffeehouses owned by Alevis were attacked in the Gazi neighborhood of İstanbul. Dozens of citizens, most of them Alevis, were killed in the incidents. The most worrisome development of recent years is the last-minute prevention of a plan to assassinate Alevi Bektaşi Federation President Ali Balkız and the federation’s secretary general, Kazım Genç. Assassination plans seized during a raid conducted at the home of the former deputy chairman of the National Police Department’s Special Operations Unit, İbrahim Şahin, were clear evidence that there were such plots. Alevis are the biggest victims of certain powers in Turkey, yet they continue to be the CHP’s most important voter group and continue to watch the Ergenekon case from a distance. But they are learning from Öymen how the CHP, in other words, how the status quo, actually sees them.
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| 21 November 2009, Saturday |
| MEHMET KAMIŞ |
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