In a sense, nowadays we witness a new phase of the impressive power struggle pushing the transformation further. The first visible confrontation took place before the Cyprus referendum process in late 2003 and 2004, during which the top command had taken the lead of vicious psychological warfare and had done its outmost to keep the status quo on the island intact. It failed, although the referendum process also turned into a failure on Turkey’s part (and one cannot blame Ankara for the latter).The second major confrontation was the escalated social tension and polarity, mainly by undemocratic social, bureaucratic, academic and political forces, with the support of the so-called “mainstream” media, in order to block Abdullah Gül for being elected president. The campaign included all possible elements such as murders and acts of terror, open threats, an e-memo and massive media manipulation, but due to a smart move by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), seen as a “lethal political adversary,” the elections and its results delivered a severe blow to those segments.
The next stage became apparent when the victorious AKP, with 47 percent of the vote, came to the inevitable conclusion that a complete constitutional change is necessary. But, due to its failures in public communications and lack of visionary strategy, when it took the path of a partial reform by merely focusing on the headscarf issue, the battle launched by the judiciary through the closure case ended with a defeat for the AKP, consolidating the notion that a move towards juristocracy (by the utterly disputable verdict and a narrow vote at the highest level) will mean truly hard times ahead.
Towards the middle of this year, the AKP, feeling rather confident, most probably seeing no other option, decided for a full-frontal political offensive, domestically and diplomatically. At the core of the domestic part lies the determination to tackle the Kurdish and other minority issues, to “persuade” the military to cease political activity and to reform the judiciary.
The development intensifying in recent weeks shows that the battlefield will be the judiciary, on which the political actors will test their strengths to its very limit, forcing their abilities to the very end. The equation shaping the battlefield is this: The AKP leadership has known that the confidence it felt in the beginning of this year, mainly due to the Ergenekon case, is again waning because it has received information that a “regrouping” of undemocratic forces is underway, this time to set a stop to the next round of presidential elections and to weaken the party. It has also been informed of the dangers of engaging with the Kurdish process: The opposition -- democratic or undemocratic -- knows that the AKP lost some votes due to the flawed conduct of the “initiative” and also because of the behavior of the Democratic Society Party (DTP). But despite the risks, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to “take it to the very end” on all domestic issues.
The developments on two “fronts” are significant enough in this context: Arrests of Col. Dursun Çiçek as well as a lieutenant colonel (in a case about buried weapons in Poyrazköy) by civilian courts signify a turning point. The court decisions mean a blow to Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, who had claimed that the document (signed by Çiçek) was a “piece of paper” and that the lightweight anti-tank weapon (LAW) weapons were “pipes.” Reports from colleagues tell us the prime minister has been informed about further “secret” documents and the civilian prosecutors’ office has some 3,000 pages of said documents. This means depending on “military resistance” to obeying the law, there may be other leaks to the press.
Meanwhile, the new allegations that the phones of the chief public prosecutor of İstanbul, Aykut Cengiz Engin, and the switchboard of the High Court of Appeals, together with charges of criminal activity brought up against the judge in Sincan Court and Ömer Faruk Eminağaoğlu, the president of the Judges and Prosecutors Association (YARSAV), mean a turning point within the judiciary. Reports yesterday stated that the request for wiretapping came from the Justice Ministry, and a court in Istanbul approved of it and extended it.
The decision was part of the investigation -- in context of Ergenekon -- on some 50 judges and prosecutors in key positions whose names and private information were found at a search of the Workers’ Party (İP) headquarters. This means, most of all, one thing: As within the military, there is also a sharpening divide within the judiciary because of the apparent ‘identity and structural crisis,’ which shatters both institutions. In other words, there battlefields within battlefields.
Democracy is tough to achieve. The elected opposition, with its severe obstinacy to commit to a civilized and rational fight, makes it only tougher. If a civilian-military balance is achieved and if the judiciary can be reformed as indicated in the EU Progress Report, the next phase will be to see whether a new, democratic type of opposition will emerge. If it does not, then -- and only then -- we can start talking about a one-party dictatorship.
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