The EU’s borders and Turkey

With remarkable objectivity, Stephens points out that: “It is half a century since Turkey first knocked on Europe’s door with a bid to join the Common Market. There were plenty of detours on the way to the start of formal accession talks in 2004. Often, it must be said, the fault lay with Turkey. Military coups and political repression did not help make the case for membership of Europe’s democratic club. That was then. Turkey is still a long way from meeting the democratic terms of EU membership, but few can doubt that it has taken big steps in the right direction. It is the fear that Turkey is within sight of doing what has been asked of it that has led Mr Sarkozy and others to repudiate the original bargain. Admitting Turkey, Mr Sarkozy says, would ‘dilute’ the Union. What he really means is that Europe does not want 70-odd million Muslims.”

The most interesting part of Stephens’ column is the argument that behind Sarkozy’s repudiation of the original bargain with Turkey is his realization that Ankara was “within sight of doing what has been asked of it.” It is certainly true that Europe was surprised at the speed of Turkish reforms between 1999 and 2004. After all, as late as December 1997, the EU had declared Turkey no longer part of the EU enlargement process. Domestic turmoil leading to Turkey’s last military intervention in Feb. 28, 1997 and the bloody war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had played a major role in Europe’s decision to sideline Ankara. Given Turkey’s troubles and Europe’s reluctance, no one expected that a few years later, in 2004, Turkey would start accession negotiations with Brussels. Therefore, it is exactly true that Sarkozy was surprised at Turkey’s ability to move rapidly with necessary reforms.

Yet, there is more than just “not wanting 70 million Muslims” in Sarkozy’s proposal of “privileged partnership” with Turkey. The real issue is the feasibility of the European project. In the eyes of France, the EU should not become an ever-enlarging entity. There should be a balance between the deepening and the widening of the union. Especially at a time when Europe has expanded to the Baltics and the Balkans, Sarkozy believes it is absolutely legitimate to ask where the borders of the EU will end. And Turkey, in this context, is the critical country. Turkey is critical not because it is Muslim but because it will tip the balance toward ever-expansion rather than political consolidation of the EU project. “Where does expansion end?” is Sarkozy’s main question. The British answer is simple, “It does not.” In the eyes of London, enlargement is the most successful policy of the EU, and there is no need to question its limits. Yet, this vision of an ever-expanding Europe will clearly end up paralyzing the EU. If Turkey is in, who can say no to Ukraine? And if Ukraine is in, why not Russia? Once Moscow is in, Europe may as well expand to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

I believe it is this vision of “the EU turning into Eurasia” that fuels the French nightmare over Turkey. In other words, the French take Europe very seriously. As Stephens argues, they are reluctant to “dilute” the EU to the degree of internal paralysis in decision making. The solution will probably require a two-speed Europe of variable geometry. An inner core that opts for federative consolidation and a periphery that has the liberty to opt out is the answer. For instance, sharing sovereignty at all levels may not please London. Britain can thus opt out and stay in the periphery. Turkey, which shares similar concerns about its national sovereignty, may also do the same. The key, of course, will be to allow Ankara to choose. Impositions will become deal breakers. This is why Sarkozy should do better than imposing a second-class sounding proposal of privileged partnership to Turkey.