Democratic consolidation and Turkey

Among the causal relationships which can be counted, for example, are the willingness of all citizens, whether civilians or not, to work within democratic rules; elections; constitutional or judicial ratification; the degree of institutionalization; and the duration and extent of meaningful changes in political institutions.

Democratic consolidation may be seen as the process of eliminating the undemocratic features of a post-authoritarian system, eliminating powerful actors' opposition to democracy and eliminating coup planning and making, especially among those who assume privileged roles within the military. Then it may be seen as establishing permanent institutions and procedures and arrangements for the functioning of democracy in place of the earlier authoritarian and anti-democratic features and processes. The aim is to produce a state in which the constitution produces a sovereign elected government where no individual or group holds veto power over the system or uses extrajudicial violence or terrorism against opponents.

Elections on their own are not a useful indicator of democratic consolidation as the powerful elite has its own interests, expectations and rules about politics. The elite may help or hinder democratization. They may agree to respect the democratic system, but may disagree on the particular institutions, events or actors which promote that elite's interests, values or alliances. There may not be agreement on various issues, such as coup avoidance, institutionalization, representation, party development, national identity and ethnic, religious or secular expectations. So, democratic consolidation involves the construction of identities, strategic interactions and political learning. Otherwise, flux, uncertainty and loss of control prevail. In these conditions, many individuals or groups cannot adapt to their immediate situation. This then results in patterns of events that affect the entire society, a potential move back toward authoritarianism, just as we saw in the Feb. 28, 1997 military intervention in Turkey. However, political events surrounding a move toward a more stable democracy can also involve a more stable interplay of institutional factors and actors, as we have seen in Turkey since 2000.

The transition to full democracy is neither a quick nor a linear process. During the transition, political power may continue to be exercised through undemocratic means, but if the transition is to succeed, there can be no power sharing between the parliament and unconstitutional powers. During the transition, interest and power groups coalesce around alleged “threats to the democratic system.” They tend not to see the electoral process as binding and strategize accordingly. They hold that coups are still possible and that the electoral system is not the only way to power. Their allies who occupy the most important policy-making positions attempt to subordinate the representatives of the public. Even elections and political parties are manipulated to attain power, leading to a strong political class that further develops power capabilities outside electoral and party channels. The continuation of their power and interests results in an inept, vicious cycle, destructive to democratic gains and institutions. Again we saw this pattern acted out in the attempts to disrupt the last general and presidential elections in Turkey.

For democratic consolidation in Turkey, it is now necessary to dismantle arrangements that impede democracy, judicially and legally eliminating reserved domains and ideological pacts that undermine the electoral process. The politicization of the military must end and Parliament must be based on electoral procedure and inclusiveness. The constitutional system must be at the center of political life and governance, and the distribution of social and economic resources throughout the country must be more equal.

Much of the debate on democratic consolidation will naturally revolve around developing the means to represent various societal interests within the government, collective bargaining, consensual policy making to bridge the gap between the state and civil society, accountability and the restructuring of civil-military relations. If consensus becomes broad enough to integrate all the ideological, religious, ethnic and political groups, then the prospects for democratic consolidation will be enhanced.

The European Union has often argued that Turkey does not meet their democratic criteria. However, with the recent democratic initiative and the attempt to uproot the deep state by means of the Ergenekon trials, we are now starting to hear good reports and encouragement of the efforts to consolidate democracy. Such developments indeed offer hope for us and for future generations. Turkey's continuing attempts to establish political freedoms, multiculturalism and human rights are the best way to ensure progress on these fronts.