‘Homecoming’ is neither defeat nor victory

Certainly a very significant move, and the fact that all of the PKK rebels and sympathizers were released signals hope for a positive development. When a group of PKK militants descended from the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan on Oct. 1, 1999, namely 10 years ago, they were all arrested and charged and given heavy prison sentences of between some 10 and 25 years. Some of those are still in jail, and that incident is still fresh in people's minds.

The latest influx will certainly mark an end to the lack of trust.

The way the government has acted so far strengthens this hope because the failure in 1999 depended much upon a very fragile and unprepared coalition, in which Devlet Bahçeli and his Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) had been active.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, so far, may have been said to have passed a critical test, and a lot depended upon the minister of the interior, Beşir Atalay, who had been constantly in touch with Ahmet Türk, the leader of the DTP. The release of 29 militants lends some advantages to the bearers of the Kurdish process -- an “internal normalization” of the highest urgency for Turkey -- before the opposition. Most certainly, the main opposition parties would have secretly been hoping for a repetition of 1999. The gates are now open for more to leave their weapons and pour in.

There are traps. The most obvious is the cliché already expressed by the less informed but most vocal opponents of the initiative. “This is a clear sign,” they say, “that the PKK is dissolving.” It is simply an illusion. With the move, the PKK seems to have added a new, unexpected element to the process. It has shown, whether one likes it or not, that Öcalan is to be taken into account and cannot be ignored.

Emre Uslu's piece yesterday in this paper is to be read carefully. He comments, on the role adopted by Öcalan, as follows:

“When we unfold Öcalan's ‘peace group' initiative we see that Öcalan, by taking such steps, reaffirms his leadership in the eyes of the state bureaucracy and the Kurdish public as well. Such steps once again prove that Öcalan is the only participant that Turkey could negotiate with. Second, the ‘peace group' initiative functions as insurance for Öcalan to test whether Turkish state institutions and groups in the PKK are sincere about possible peace. It seems that Öcalan, while negotiating with the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), is not sure about what the other institutions, i.e., the military, the judiciary and the Interior Ministry, think about the peace process.”

Once you look at the composite nature of those selected in the “peace group,” Öcalan seems to be saying, “I am in control of the mountains, the camps and the diaspora.” As Uslu points out, he has taken a proactive step to speed up the process, to force the government to also do the same.

The nine-part communiqué of demands that has been brought into Turkey by the 34 is also rather mild in tone. It calls for dialogue and negotiations, demands freedom of usage and development of the native tongue, Kurdish names for children and education in Kurdish, freedom of organization based on the Kurdish identity and free expression thereof, life in security away from special forces and village guards and a civilian constitution. In what may look like a debatable part, it also calls for making public Öcalan's “road map” for a political solution.

At this stage, when the process now unfolds and enters the sphere of the National Security Council (MGK), etc., extreme caution is necessary. The “surrender” does not mean “repentance” -- it is only a gesture. If this is to be a negotiation, and it is, it should not contain such words.

Second, and perhaps most important, the “welcoming euphoria” within the Kurdish segment has already been an element of fury within the Turkish; it should not be presented as an act of victory for the PKK. The issue of the Kurdish process is utterly divisive. In the presence of an equally populist and irresponsible opposition, the task of the DTP should be to act on the contrary. The more ceremonial the masses are, the more risky it will be for a lasting peace to succeed: they should know better than any other actor.