Iranian versus American statecraft

Therefore when the Islamic regime needed time to re-establish and consolidate control without any foreign interference in its internal affairs, Washington acted the way Tehran wanted it to act by not interfering. Since the Obama administration refused to make the question of regime survival part of its strategy, shortly after the elections, the focus once again turned to the main business of stopping Iran's nuclear program. This, one can argue, was exactly what the rulers in Tehran wanted Washington to do: focus on the nukes and ignore the regime's instability.

There is an element of irony here. Washington would certainly be less concerned about Iran if a pro-Western and relatively more democratic regime were pursuing a nuclear program. In other words, the nature of the regime is very important in the way the West approaches nuclear proliferation. All you have to do is to look at India. The way India is treated by Washington proves that all proliferation is not equal. The West cares about the political orientation of the government in question mainly because it is the politics of the regime that eventually determines whether it might use nuclear weapons in an aggressive way or give them to a terrorist group. As a result, what should shape the response to Iran is not simply the nuclear issue but how Iran develops politically. This is why most democratic activists were frustrated with the lack of political pressure on the Islamic regime after the fraudulent elections. They believe an opportunity for regime change was wasted. Iranian statecraft once again managed to dodge a bullet and carried on its art of political survival.

In the meantime, American statecraft is now contemplating options. It is clear that the option of a military strike is losing momentum. The Obama administration believes that such a strike would only delay the Iranian program. But much more importantly, the political and economic price would be exorbitantly high: any military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would trigger extensive Iranian retaliation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The world markets would also panic as the price of oil would probably double, right when a global economic recovery appears to be taking place. Finally, the West also rightly believes that a military strike would consolidate the weakened regime and rally the people around the flag. To make things worse, such nationalist fervor in Iran would see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the highest priority.

Given the fact that the military option is off the table, the only other American option is to learn to live with Iranian nuclear proliferation. In such a context, to deter and contain Iran would become America's strategic objective. Deterrence will demand clear communication with Iran. Leaving no room for ambiguity would be crucial. The Islamic regime would need to clearly understand that if it uses nuclear weapons, it would face a devastating military response. The same rule would apply to providing nuclear weapons to Hamas and Hezbullah. It should also be made clear that Iran could face pre-emptive strikes in case it mobilizes any kind of nuclear attack plan. To contain Iran would require a mix of incentives and sanctions to limit what it does in the nuclear realm. Sanctions work best when they enjoy broad international support and are applied in a targeted way. This is why sanctions should target the ruling elite, the revolutionary guard and the oil and gas sector. Even then, they may not be efficient in the absence of Russian and Chinese support. In short, American statecraft will continue to face an uphill struggle as long Iranian statecraft continues to excel in the art of political survival.