The leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) turned down the CHP leader’s request to hold the meeting in front of cameras in an effort to prevent this meeting from turning into a show. Baykal regards this meeting as food for his individual image beyond the democratic initiative and even beyond the policies of his party. Even the “platonic love” polemics between CHP leader Baykal and AK Party leader Erdoğan was oozing with tabloid content.One thing that is ignored in these polemics is certain. The initiative will radically change the political party spectrum in the future. All parties are aware of this. The political spectrum will never be the same after the first steps of the initiative are taken and the process of settlement of the Kurdish issue has started.
Full of hope
Whether the glass is full or empty is dependent on how you look at the glass. Only half of the glass is full. Still, there are many reasons for being pessimistic for those who are inclined to view things negatively. There is still no news about the roadmap that Abdullah Öcalan delivered to the prison administration on İmralı Island about a month ago. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society (DTP) has been organizing rallies to protest this in the Southeast. Immediately after starting the new legislative year, Parliament passed a bill extending the mandate for the Turkish military to conduct cross-border operations into northern Iraq. The passage of this bill is regarded by Kurds as a continuation of the war. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is still adamantly opposed to the initiative, accusing all those who lend support to the initiative of being traitors. Even the CHP, which has agreed to meet with the prime minister, has had their share of accusations thrown at them. Despite strong opposition and unwanted developments, the hopeful atmosphere that the democratic initiative has created is continuing.
The busy diplomatic traffic the prime minister conducted on Tuesday during his visit to Iraq accompanied by nine ministers as well as the 40 accords inked during this visit are regarded as Turkey’s search for peace and security both inside the country and in its region. The border with Syria has been virtually eliminated. After the visa requirements were mutually abolished, it seems that a quick integration between the two countries can be expected. The fact that the two countries, which were hostile until very recently, are now singing songs of fraternity today is regarded by many as the existence of Turkey’s will to solve the Kurdish issue at home.
On the other hand, there has been an escalation in negative sentiments against Kurds in western provinces. The Kurds still cannot fully trust the state. Yet, no one intends to quit. Hopes dominate over all pessimism. Many people still have the belief that this issue will be settled this time and that Turkey will escape the spiral of violence.
Israel and Armenia
For a big and assertive Turkey that conducts effective diplomacy in its region, the Kurdish issue is a small problem. Yet, for a Turkey that has closed its doors to the outside world, isolated itself and has been running after small plans, the Kurdish issue is a big and problematic issue.
For the last several years, Turkey has been trying to build a new structure gradually in its region. Turkey has directly focused on the people who seek peace instead of the intrigues or conspiracies of the politicians ruling these peoples in the Middle East. Turkey is seeking to achieve peace in the Middle East using strong arguments. It also translates its quest for peace into a common interest for the entire Middle East and the Caucasus. Integration with Syria and its increasing weight in Iraq in the post-US era are the result of this quest for peace. A new structure is being founded in the hands of Turkey in the Middle East. Despite its harsh reactions, the structure Turkey is building will provide the security that Israel needs most. The formula that has been maintained until now has failed to bring any good to anyone. Now Turkey is building a new peace-oriented formula. The military exercise crisis between Turkey and Israel is one of the results of Turkey’s search for a new structure. In a short time, Israel will realize that this development is valuable for itself.
The protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia imply that Turkey, pressed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, will take this peace structure to the Caucasus with support from the US. Azerbaijan knows that it cannot save Nagorno-Karabakh from occupation by just maintaining its hostility against Armenia. On the other hand, Armenia realizes that it cannot continue to exist by defying Turkey in line with the wishes of the Armenian diaspora. Under these circumstances, a new structure of peace is being constructed by Turkey. The fact that Russia has become part of this formula as a constructive element shows that this structure is built on realities, not on fancies or dreams.
Domestic opposition
The strongest resistance to the radical changes in Turkey and its relationships to its neighbors is brought forth by the opposition parties. While the government has no problem convincing Syria, Iraq, Armenia or Azerbaijan, it fails to make the opposition understand its policies. Opposition parties tended to react more harshly to the opening of the common border with Armenia than Azerbaijan. The biggest resistance to the democratic initiative comes from the opposition parties. This fragile problem is closely related to the Kurdish language.
The Kurdish issue is essentially a Kurdish language problem. If restrictions on the learning and teaching of the Kurdish language and if the use of this language becomes freer, then Turkey’s ethnic problem will be mitigated. While it advocates the continuation of these restrictions, the MHP explains its justifications as follows. The Kurdish issue is mainly the Kurdish language, i.e., a linguistics problem. The MHP raises objections to the “second language” voiced as part of the initiative. During the speech he delivered during the recent meeting of his party’s parliamentary group, the MHP leader formulated his most basic objection to the initiative as follows: “In a process by which a second or other language is made part of education, how will we be able to guarantee a ‘single nation’ with those who will develop an identity with this language? At the end of a process in which a secondary language becomes official, how will we be able to preserve the ‘single state’ structure?” Do the president and the prime minister, who talk about being a ‘single nation,’ have answers to these objections? Yes, certainly.
Brushing the exaggerated details aside, the heart of the issue is this objection raised by the MHP. Can the MHP be persuaded? It is possible. With a simple argument: When you ban a language and an identity along with it, then you cannot make the ‘single nation’ live. This is the question the MHP should think about: What are the consequences of banning the Kurdish language: boosting or dimming the ethnic identity? Is the connection between language and identity really what the MHP leader portrays it to be? Don’t we virtually experience a separation triggered by the ban on the Kurdish language?
Voters represent the most powerful force that can put an end to the harsh resistance waged by opposition parties. If the nation supports the settlement, then opposition parties will have to revise their policies. The rapprochement between the CHP and the AK Party can be seen as an indication of overcoming another threshold.
The barometer still signals a refreshing atmosphere. The climate that reinforces peace outside is translated into optimism with respect to the democratic initiative. We are in the second half of October as we wait for significant steps.