‘Not the same anymore’

Not the same, indeed. The signing of protocols raises the curtain on a roadmap over a rugged terrain. It replaces the old parameters with new ones, and reshuffles the cards for various actors. While some let out a sigh of slight satisfaction, others will air frustration.

No doubt the powerful international actors belong to the first category. For the US, as well as the EU Commission, the initialing for rapprochement means a new spirit, a pledge for a more stable, more secure Southern Caucasus. Whether Russia truly joins these two and cooperates with this goal remains to be seen -- and it will be quite a key for success.

For the main actors, problems abound. Although both governments, in Ankara and Yerevan, have the arithmetic means to ratify and implement the protocols, the debate will be very fierce in domestic atmospheres equally poisonous, bearing the risk of radicalization in politics.

It is obvious that the administration in Yerevan operates under heavier strain. In that sense President Sarksyan and Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian must be commended for their resolve in boldness. The issue of Armenian normalization has, on the other “side,” been somewhat overshadowed by the Kurdish initiative, which helps keep it slightly out of focus. Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is busy seeking consensus on domestic reform, knowing that some 60-70 percent of the population back the opening of the Armenian border.

But it is clear that both sides have pragmatism in common. In his address, Sarksyan has underlined and clarified the following, which raises hopes:

“Independence dictates the will and determination to take responsible decisions; it dictates pragmatism and forward-looking sustained work. That is the road I have selected. … There is no alternative to the establishment of relations with Turkey without any preconditions. It is the dictate of the time. It is not this need that is being debated today. The concern of individuals and some political forces is caused by the different interpretation of certain provisions contained in the Protocols and their historic mistrust of Turkey.”

According to Sarksyan, the issues related to the massive crime against humanity in 1915 will remain separately on the international agenda and it will not be the commission -- an intergovernmental one -- which will define its nature. The border issues, as well as the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh are to be dealt with “outside” the protocols. This is the correct understanding of the texts signed, and perhaps therefore, it leaves two actors in discontent.

For the Armenian diaspora, the signing is a “sellout.” As all the diasporas are, this one -- at least considerable parts of it -- also acted as a hostage to maximalism, while not seeking to understand the realities in Armenia proper, expectations of mainland Armenians and prospects for security and prosperity in the region. It has refused to be in synch with the evolutionary approach, a new one endorsed by the democratization process in Turkey.

As for Baku, it has been a scene of contradictions. President Ilham Aliyev's administration has been more active in seeking ways to accelerate the Minsk Process, true, but it has apparently not been convinced of the Turkish vision that normalized relations with Armenia will be a much more pragmatic path for “reducing regional strife to zero” -- it is an obvious difference between the old and new thinking. Baku should understand that normalization will also bring Azerbaijan closer to the West, because no longer can any actor can remain the same.

But the real work begins now. The second benchmark will have been surpassed once the parliaments reach the level of votes for ratification. Steps will be required from both sides, and they may not be that easy. Still, what counts is the resolve. Let the notion that “remaining in the cold is unsustainable” guide the rational political forces of both sides.