Mainly two “theories” have been advanced in response to that question. According to those who are convinced that the AKP is pursuing a hidden agenda to turn Turkey into another Iran (pretending to run towards the West while in reality heading towards the East), the AKP adopted the reforms only to help legitimize and consolidate its power. As soon as the decision to start accession talks was made, it turned away from reforms and revealed its true Islamist and nationalist character. Even some Europhiles who were supportive of the AKP's reform agenda between 2002 and 2005 began to explain the stalling of reforms by the AKP's inert conservatism and proneness to accommodate the status quo, meaning the secular nationalist bureaucracy, in order to stay in power and enjoy its benefits.Others explained the stalling of reforms mainly by the negative signals coming from the EU. The offer of “privileged partnership” instead of full membership put forward mainly by the leaders of France and Germany contradicted the EU's commitments to Turkey. The Greek Cypriots were accepted into the EU despite their rejection of the United Nations plan to reunify the island supported by the EU, while the Turkish Cypriots, who adopted the plan, were left out. The ensuing steep decline in public support for EU accession encouraged the nationalist and Euroskeptic opposition to reforms, paving the way to coup attempts, threats of intervention by the military and the public prosecutor filing a closure case against the AKP at the Constitutional Court.
I have strongly subscribed to the second “theory” and am happy to see that the Independent Commission on Turkey, a group of prominent Europeans who strongly support Turkey's accession to the EU if it fulfils the conditions of membership, in its recently issued excellent assessment of the current state of Turkey-EU relationship, also agrees. The report by the commission titled “Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle” says:
“Regrettably, negative reactions since 2005 from European political leaders and growing hesitation by the European public about further enlargement, have given Turkey the impression that it is not welcome, even if it were to fulfill all membership conditions. Moreover, the process itself has been hindered by the effective blockage of more than half of the negotiating chapters.
“Support in Turkey has faded for both the EU accession process and the implementation of difficult and sometimes expensive reforms. This was aggravated by internal political difficulties, in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) found itself under serious pressure from emboldened Turkish Euroskeptics who, partly under the guise of defending secular principles against a supposed advance of Islamism, attempted to delay the implementation of political and social reforms needed for EU membership.”
The commission underlines that the “negative attitudes and policies of European leaders are in clear contradiction to all previous EU decisions” and “put in question EU credibility, reliability and the principle … that agreements are to be honored.” The chairman of the commission, Martti Ahtisaari (former president of Finland, Nobel Peace Prize laureate 2008), while introducing the report at a press conference in Paris, emphasized the point by saying that if the EU fails to honor its commitments to Turkey, he will have to leave Europe and “seek asylum in Namibia.”
The theory that blamed the AKP for the stalling of reforms has become increasingly untenable, with the initiation of what increasingly looks like a second period of reforms by the AKP government, despite a total lack of encouragement from the EU.
The AKP government, after more than four years of delay, in December 2008 enacted a new National Program for EU reforms, appointed a full-time EU negotiator, launched a Kurdish-language state television channel in 2009, initiated serious discussions to address the concerns of the Alevi minority, adopted legislation to restrict the jurisdiction of military courts, recently declared its commitment to finding a political and civilian solution to the Kurdish problem, and took steps towards normalizing relations with Armenia and supporting efforts towards the reunification of Cyprus. The question currently being debated in Turkey is not whether the AKP government lacks resolve for reform, but whether it can tackle reforms on all fronts at once despite strong opposition coming from main opposition parties.
The AKP may not be the ideally liberal and democratic political party, but it currently is Turkey's best hope for transforming itself towards a state and society on EU norms.