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ÖMER TAŞPINAR o.taspinar@todayszaman.com Columnists

Turkey and Armenia inch closer


Last week's joint declaration that Turkey and Armenia had initialed two protocols -- one for the establishment of diplomatic relations, the other for the development of bilateral relations (opening of the border) -- came as a welcome surprise to many analysts, including myself, who had started to lose faith in the normalization process.

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Just as I was getting ready to uncork a nice Caucasian champagne to celebrate, I realized that the two sides have also declared that the protocols will have to go through parliamentary ratifications. If all goes well, and that may prove a big “if,” this ratification will take place after an “internal consultation” process of six weeks. Again if all goes according to the plan, the legislative approval will arrive just two days before the Oct. 14 World Cup qualifier soccer match between Armenia and Turkey, due to be played in the western Turkish city of Bursa. Ankara and Washington hope that Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan will accept the invitation to attend, just as Turkish President Abdullah Gül initiated the current normalization process by attending the first round match in Yerevan in September 2008. No need to mention who won that first game, since we are all winners in this win-win process, right? OK, Turkey won, but who cares?  

So where do we stand now? The good news is that the so-called “soccer-diplomacy” is alive and well. The not so good news is that we are still at halftime, and the fanatic supporters of the two national teams can cancel the game or disqualify their teams by throwing sharp knifes on the field. A bit of history may help you understand the logic of my skepticism. A full deal seemed imminent in April of this year when the two countries initialed a similar preliminary agreement, including a plan to reopen the border. That declaration of April 22, like this current one of Aug. 31, had also come after several months of Swiss mediation and arm-twisting by Washington.

Then, as now, the declaration had come as a surprise because Ankara always insisted that normalization with Armenia was impossible until Yerevan made peace with Baku. Turkey had recognized Armenia as an independent state after the Soviet collapse in 1991 but sealed its border two years later during Azerbaijan's war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mainly Armenian enclave within Azeri territories.

So why did Turkey agree to normalize relations earlier this year? The decision on April 22 was driven by a political calendar over which Ankara had no control. The main reason behind Ankara's decision to prioritize relations with Armenia, despite Azeri objections, was to stop the American Congress and the White House from adopting language labeling the mass slaughter of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. The April 22 declaration only partially achieved its mission. The White House issued its traditional Armenian Remembrance day letter on April 24 without referring to the “g” word as Turkish diplomats call it. This time, however, it was the “m” word that caught the Turkish nationalist establishment off guard. Barack Obama once again displayed his authenticity by using the Armenian term “Meds Yeghern” meaning “Great Catastrophe” -- a heart-felt way of referring to the more generic notion of genocide.

Needless to say, Turks were not impressed. It did not take very long for Ankara to revert to their previous policy. In early May, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Baku and promised the Azeri Parliament that Turkey would never normalize relations with Armenia without a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Erdoğan's about face reflected two political concerns. First, and most important, was the nationalist opposition at home. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) felt vulnerable because it lost some votes to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the March 2009 local elections. Second, the fear that Azerbaijan would turn towards Russia.

In the meantime, the domestic reaction against Armenia's President Sarksyan has also been very harsh. Both the hard-line Dashnak nationalist opposition at home and the Armenian diaspora in the West accused him of agreeing to a joint historical commission that might call the genocide into question. Making things worse, Erdoğan's words in Baku provided ammunition to Sarksyan's opponents who now accused him of selling out Karabakh. Under such difficult circumstances, the Armenian President retaliated by saying he would not attend the soccer match on Oct. 14 unless normalization was clearly under way. So, last week's announcement comes just in time to maintain the façade of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. If no sharp knives are thrown onto the field, soccer diplomacy will inch forward. It may still be too early to speak of a genuine rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan. Yet, no one accuses the two parties of not trying. Negotiations between stubborn neighbors are never easy. But as Winston Churchill wisely said, “To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.”

07 September 2009, Monday
ÖMER TAŞPINAR
   
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Other Articles of the Columnist

  Turkey and Armenia inch closer
  Where’s the American conspiracy in all this?
  What is at stake in Afghanistan?
  Obama’s difficult summer
  Turkish-Russian pipelines of realpolitik
  Ankara’s Kurdish opening and Washington
  Iran and Iraq: diverging Shiite patterns
  Domestic determinants of Turkish foreign policy (2)
  Domestic determinants of Turkish foreign policy
  De-mystifying political Islam
  Iran’s legitimacy crisis
  Iran’s election: Free and fair?
  Obama’s speech and Pakistan
  Oil: blessing or curse for Iraqi Kurds?
  Turkey’s about-face in the Caucasus
  A grand bargain in the Middle East?
  Ergenekon and the West
  Washington’s Pakistan predicament
  Dodging a bullet with Washington
  Obama’s diminishing expectations of the world
Columnists
ABDULHAMİT BİLİCİ
ABDULLAH BOZKURT
ALİ BULAÇ
ALİ H. ASLAN
AMANDA PAUL
ANDREW FINKEL
ASIM ERDİLEK
AYŞE KARABAT
BEJAN MATUR
BERİL DEDEOĞLU
BERK ÇEKTİR
BÜLENT KENEŞ
BÜLENT KORUCU
CHARLOTTE MCPHERSON
DOĞU ERGİL
EKREM DUMANLI
EMRE USLU
ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN
FATMA DİŞLİ ZIBAK
FİKRET ERTAN
GÜRKAN ZENGİN
HASAN KANBOLAT
HÜSEYİN GÜLERCE
İBRAHİM KALIN
İBRAHİM ÖZTÜRK
İHSAN DAĞI
İHSAN YILMAZ
KATHY HAMILTON
KERİM BALCI
KLAUS JURGENS
LALE KEMAL
MEHMET KAMIŞ
MICHAEL KUSER
MUHAMMED ÇETİN
MÜMTAZER TÜRKÖNE
NICOLE POPE
ÖMER TAŞPINAR
ORHAN KEMAL CENGİZ
PAT YALE
ŞAHİN ALPAY
SELÇUK GÜLTAŞLI
SUAT KINIKLIOĞLU
YAVUZ BAYDAR