A good neighbor

For those who have known Ahmet Davutoğlu, none of the Turkish foreign policy promises would come as a surprise. I was most probably the first journalist to invite him to give a long, live interview at the state-controlled TRT television channel in the mid-1990s, soon after he had returned from Malaysia and had started to impress us all with his analysis in the Yeni Şafak daily. It was a different period and I remember, too, that there was a politely expressed “discontent” at TRT for my choice of what was seen as “someone marginal.”

Times change and now that he has been given full power to exercise foreign policy, much more than he had under the title of adviser, Davutoğlu is bound to walk the way as his vision dictates.

His presence solidified the line that has been represented by Abdullah Gül for a long time. With his skills of persuasion, Davutoğlu seems to have boosted the emerging notion that in order to overcome obstacles to acting like a regional power, as part of the strong, global democratic family, Turkey must move on to completely new paradigms. There are two premises: a) The reform process and change in foreign policy will have to continue, independent of a weakening, external (European Union) drive, because the domestic dynamics are already powerful and inevitable enough, b) Internationally, no other time better justifies a full-scale leap toward a “zero problem neighborhood policy” and Turkey with a single-majority government is better equipped to adapt to the swiftly changing realities in its vicinity.

Suat Kınıklıoğlu, the deputy chairman for external affairs for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), is talking about the “shock” among his European colleagues. I would call it a perplexity and carefully exclude those within the EU who not only follow the remarkable signals from Turkey closely, but have for along time believed in her prospects and capabilities because they were able to sense the promises (for better or worse, but never the same), that both Turkish sociology and politics have offered for some time. Certainly it is an ongoing momentum, kept, somehow, against all odds and undemocratic pressures.

“When you look at the overall picture, the Kurdish issue, the Armenia move, the Cyprus negotiations, Turkey's bid to resolve the recent dispute between Iraq and Syria; all of these moves give a clue about Turkey and its foreign policy establishment's capacity to undergo different processes at the same time. I sense a feeling of disbelief when I speak to my European friends. They are still trying to understand and comprehend these moves. Some European friends may have difficulty digesting Turkey's role and determination in foreign policy initiatives but, at the end of the day, they will have to accept the reality that Turkey has been undertaking all of these moves both for itself and its region,” says Kınıklıoğlu, and underlines the gap of understanding and traps of miscommunication between the distracted (some self-centered) European politicians, at a time when the focus on Turkey will have to intensify.

Because, how Turkey will (be able to) shape its regional policy will, to a great extent, shape the overall foreign policy and security of the EU. The counter-arguments against Turkish EU membership will, no matter what, have to be replaced the more successfully Ankara deals with Iraq, Armenia and Cyprus. (If the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] win the Greek elections, the prospects for a solution will possibly rise even on the irrational dispute over the territorial waters of the Aegean, a nuisance that preoccupies both NATO and the EU.) Do not say later that you have not been warned. Expect moves, not only on Armenia, Cyprus and Iraq, but also on the Halki Seminary deadlock. As I return from my relaxing vacation, I will not hesitate to call the upcoming autumn an intense time, open to all sorts of surprises.