Regardless of its unclear content, regardless of the not-yet-shaped plan, the process has started. It is impossible to put the toothpaste back into the tube. But…I remember very well the excitement that we had on Dec. 16, 2004, during the European Union summit. At that summit, the EU decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey.
The country had held its breath and waited for the declaration of the decision. When it was announced, there were fireworks shows. I think the same happiness will never be repeated, even on the day that Turkey joins the EU.
The most important reason for this great happiness was the great expectation. Many people had the wrong impression; they thought that everything would change very fast, we would be richer tomorrow and within two days Turkish citizens would have the right of free movement. At that time, most Turkish citizens believed that starting negotiations was almost the same as finishing negotiations. The main reason for this erroneous belief was the lack of information about the structure of the EU. I think that still in this country, we don't talk about the benefits and harms of the EU.
While the EU process is now going on at its own pace, Turkey is discussing another process, the democratization process. Both the objections and the expectations are very high, but then again neither the objections nor the expectations are realistic. Beside that, the government's means and possibilities are not very vast, either.
On one side, there is an opposition whose reason d'être is based on an outdated Turkish nationalism. It is accusing the government of treason. On the other hand, there are some policy-making Kurds who think that the government should sit at the same table with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization.
The general public thinks that this issue, whether it is the southeastern problem, Kurdish question or terror trouble, should come to an end.
The government has already declared that it will listen to everyone before shaping its plan, although for many other issues listening to everyone is not the government's habit. It also underlined the importance of the mode of the initiative, which is another positive sign. I guess it also knows very well that from now on it does not have chance to say, “I wanted to do it, but the opposition prevented me.”
The government has to be quick in this process for many reasons. First of all, some circles are not happy about even the idea of a solution that would bring about a powerful and prosperous country. There could be incidents which might severely harm the process.
Secondly, for many Kurds this process is sort of the “last test” of the sincerity of the government. They are running out of patience. The PKK, in order to manage the process, has already started to spread propaganda questioning the intentions of the government. The only way to prevent it is to act quickly. It is also important to marginalize the PKK by removing at least the political reasons for its support. It is crucial to make the Kurds feel that they are no longer excluded. At the end, to remove restrictions on private broadcasts in languages other than Turkish or to appoint Kurdish-speaking civil servants to predominantly Kurdish areas or affirmative action policies in the region do not require constitutional amendments. The other issues, the status of the Kurdish language, an amnesty for PKK members and the structure of local administrations, can be solved in a second phase after a little bit of normalization. This normalization will be easier if the public learns more about realities, like the fact that some land mines and hand grenades that killed our young soldiers may not necessarily have been attacks by the PKK.
In short, the process needs good management at many different levels; it is important to keep expectations high and to support hopes for a solution but to do it in a realistic way. Otherwise, there is danger waiting ahead at the end, after all -- the road to hell is paved with good intentions.