It may be argued that the AKP is, of course, not only eight years old, considering its background in the National Vision Movement, whose first political party was organized in 1970. It may, however, also be argued, that the AKP is indeed only eight years old because it does not share much with the National Vision Movement, in which its roots lie.There surely are many diverging views on what the political nature of the AKP is and is not. It defines itself as a “conservative democratic” party, but if you ask not only advocates of authoritarian official secularism in Turkey but also analysts of think tanks close to neocon circles (and consequently the Israel lobby) in the United States and even “Kemalists” of Nordic countries, the AKP is an Islamist party bent on transforming Turkey into another Iran or at best Malaysia. Those opponents of the AKP who find the “Islamist” label too biased and want to appear more reasonable argue that the leader of the AKP, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is the “Turkish Putin” and that the AKP has well advanced in transforming Turkey into a Russian-type democracy. There are, of course, others who profess exactly opposite views, saying that Erdoğan is the greatest reformer in Turkey after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Turgut Özal and the AKP is moving Turkey toward a democracy and economy based on European norms, even if it may be refused membership in the European Union.
The debate over the nature of the AKP has produced a lot of writing that amounts to nothing more than propaganda and trash, but also academic studies of significance. The best to my mind among the latter is forthcoming by Routledge publishers in Britain on Sept. 17. The co-authors of the book are well-known scholars of Turkish politics both at home and abroad. One of them is the doyen of Turkish political scientists and constitutional lawyers, Professor Ergun Özbudun, and the other is Professor William Hale, who is well known especially for his studies on Turkish foreign policy and the Turkish military. The identity of the authors surely attests to the quality of the study at hand, titled “Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP.” I was given the privilege to read the manuscript of the book and quote below some of the major conclusions of the study:
“It may be possible to classify the AKP as something like the Muslim equivalent of conservative parties in Western democracies. While embracing faith-based values on a range of social, cultural and perhaps economic issues, it rejects the idea of establishing an Islamic state, whose laws and procedures cannot be reconciled with basic democratic norms…
“In its approach to the Kurdish question Tayyip Erdoğan made some important good will gestures, going further than previous governments in giving official recognition of the Kurdish identity. However, the AKP failed to develop or implement a coherent policy on this issue, which would have met the legitimate demands of the Kurdish community while preserving Turkey's territorial integrity. Similarly, in its reaction to the modest demands of the Turkish Alevis, the AKP government preferred to opt for the ‘politics of avoidance,' rather than taking concrete positive steps…
“The AKP also made mistakes in other areas of public policy, although these had virtually nothing to do with Islamism… The claims by its hardest critics … are mostly unsubstantiated -- and in many cases grossly exaggerated, if not downright false… If it had seriously sought to turn Turkey into an Islamic state it would surely have taken some clear steps to that end during its relatively long stay in power. Instead of undermining democracy, it had done more to widen civil liberties than any preceding government since the 1960s…
“At the beginning of 2009, after six years in power, it appeared that the AKP was faced with a choice between continuing to act as a liberal, reformist force or making its peace with a conservative state establishment. Although the fear that it might turn Turkey into an Islamist autocracy was still apparently pervasive in the Republican People's Party [CHP], the armed forces and the judiciary, this seemed less realistic than the opposite perception that the AKP might slip down the same road as previous center-right parties, shifting back to authoritarianism and isolationist national attitudes, perhaps even as part of a Faustian pact with its former opponents to prevent the launch of another closure case.”
The AKP government, in the midst of the world economic recession, which has affected the Turkish economy rather badly, started initiatives at the turn of 2009 to deal with the basic problems of Turkish democracy. A state TV channel started broadcasting in Kurdish and talks were started with representatives of the Alevi community on measures to address their complaints and demands. The AKP government announced last month that it has decided to take measures to solve the Kurdish problem, whatever the political costs. Developments in Turkey since Özbudun and Hale concluded writing their book early this year seem to signal that the reformist energies of the AKP may not be exhausted.