It was as though we were in a never-ending battle with another country. The battle itself and the inevitable human rights violations that came with it became a part of normal life. Just like how today we are tired of reading newspaper stories of brawls in shanty neighborhoods, our reaction to injustices toward Kurds were just as apathetic. It is for this reason that we kept the Kurdish issue outside our perception of politics and left it up to the military.However, today a major part of this threshold of perception has been overcome. As some Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputies have stated as well, the real development that has encouraged the ruling power to take up the initiative to resolve the Kurdish problem is the continuation of the case filed against the Ergenekon gang.
Those who question the legitimacy of the Ergenekon case on grounds that it is a political case are those who are still unfamiliar with the idea of a non-militaristic democracy. Certainly the AK Party is happy with the political benefits of this case. But contrary to what many believe, the AK Party shows the utmost care not to influence the case in any way because it knows that doing so would only harm the positive political developments.
This conscious stance of the government has made it extremely difficult to ignore pieces of evidence in the Ergenekon case. The most profound piece of evidence is the existence of illegal structures within the military that operate under the chain of command. Here we face a dilemma from the perspective of “white” Turks. In the modern world, which we seek to be a part of, the military is not allowed to have illegal groups. On the other hand, if attempts to form illegal organizations are not approved by the institution they do not pose a threat because it is believed those with such tendencies will automatically be removed by the institution's administrative measures. In other words, in the modern perception, every institution of the nation-state is believed to be essentially “right and clean.” But what if illegal attempts are a part of the institution's hierarchical structure? Although we cannot yet make such an assessment regarding Ergenekon, we know that it was the case with JİTEM. We know that in Turkey the military set up an illegal organization and directed it to carry out illegal activities. We know that many members of the organization were intentionally used to commit crimes, and most importantly, we know that not only was all this kept from the public but the public was lied to. It is for this reason that JİTEM corresponds to a critical perception for statist “good citizens.” Exposing JİTEM means questioning the legitimacy of other military activities. For this segment of society, the military is the sole defender and guarantor of the regime in Turkey, and it is this conviction that has led the public to approve many of the “inappropriate” actions of military personnel. That is why the reality of JİTEM was ignored for so many years.
Now, how can we explain the reason for the growing critical perception? It is clear that the reason for the change is not related to the experiences of the Kurds. While a global change in mentality, globalization and the Obama factor may be pointed to as reasons, the real reason behind the change is that the image of the military has drastically changed in the minds of “white” Turks to such an extent that it seems extremely difficult to restore. This image was always glorified by the media and presented to the public. The military was presented as being “chosen” and superior to civilians. People were made to believe that military personnel and especially those in the command staff had superior management skills supported by advanced technology.
Today the military is in need of public support, and they are finding themselves in a position where they virtually need to put on a performance for the public. Consequently, this perhaps for the first time is allowing “white” Turks to see that the people they have chosen as their ideological leaders are just like them and nothing more. This understanding had a deep and demoralizing effect on the upper bourgeoisie class. To be concise, these well-trained classes have experienced a deep disappointment in the military's ability to manage Turkey.
That was the critical threshold. It became possible to see the military “as is” and understand the political dimension of JİTEM. Since the psychological barrier caused by the ideological dependence on the military has been removed, we have also found the opportunity to see the Kurdish issue “as is.”