Iran and Iraq: diverging Shiite patterns

Under the spiritual guidance of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq appears to have take some important lessons from the mistakes of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Ayatollah al-Sistani is a cleric who adheres to what is sometimes referred to as the “quietist” school of Shiite Islam. According to the quietist school, the Shiite clergy should disavow an overt role in politics. In other words, the realm of religion should not encroach on the realm of politics. Needless to say, this willingness to distance Islam from politics does not stem from a strong belief in secularism. To the contrary, it comes from a willingness to hold religion above politics. Religion, simply put, should transcend politics because it is too sacred to be politicized and trivialized at the hands of politically ambitious clerics with questionable theological expertise.

Interestingly, this quietist school in Iraq has managed to maintain a much higher level of political and social legitimacy for the religious authority of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. As a result, the marjiyya -- the term used to describe the authority of most senior ayatollahs in Shiite Islam -- has more spiritual influence in Iraq than it does in Iran. The reason is simple: The Islamic revolution in Iran ended up eroding the prestige of religion. As I previously argued in this column, the Islamic revolution in Iran ended up demystifying Islam by bringing it to power. Once in power, Islam became overly political. It assumed governmental responsibilities. It had to deliver.

This process of politicization for Shiite Islam culminated with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the eventual leader of the Iranian revolution, first elaborated the idea of clerical rule in a series of lectures during his tenure in Najaf. Known as vilayat-e faqih, the theory holds that God's authority -- passed down through a line of imams starting with Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, and ending with the 12th imam, who disappeared in the ninth century -- is held by a cleric chosen as the supreme leader. After the Islamic revolution, this theory was enshrined in the constitution, and the supreme guide's authority has served as the basis of governance in Iran since the revolution. According to this new paradigm, there was to be theocratic guidance and a solution to all issues.

The results were not very encouraging for the future of Islam in Iran. In the absence of miraculous religious solutions to all the governance challenges facing a complex society such as Iran, the people of Iran came to realize that Islam was not the solution to all the problems under the sun. This was the beginning of demystification for Islam in Iran. In fact Islam, far from providing solutions, was incrementally becoming the problem.

The authority of clerics in Iraq, on the other hand, lacked any legal basis. There was no Iraqi equivalent to vilayat-e faqih. The authority of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani was not imposed by law or instituted in the constitution in the form of a theocratic political system. Instead, the prestige of the marjiyya was derived thanks to the popularity and spiritual authority of al-Sistani at the grassroots level. As corrupt politicians competed for political power, the quietist school conquered the hearts and minds of millions who were disillusioned by politics. These millions began to look to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani as their spiritual authority. Today, such is the level of the popularity of al-Sistani that the most devout of his followers consider his edicts to carry the force of law.