The future of the political role of the military in Turkey

The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), which is in the main interested in preserving bureaucratic custody over democracy and political autonomy of the military in Turkey, has declared it will appeal to the Constitutional Court for the abrogation of the law, on grounds of violation of the provisions of the Constitution of 1982, drawn up by the military regime in power between 1980 and 1983. It is possible that the Constitutional Court will find the CHP's appeal justified. It is also clear that the current law does not exhaust legal amendments necessary to align civilian control of the military in Turkey with EU norms. And surely, in order to achieve it, nothing less than a fundamental change of mentality among both the military and civilian elites is necessary.

Still, the ongoing investigation and trial against the shadowy criminal gang called Ergenekon, which allegedly conspired to overthrow the elected government; the fact that more than a dozen officers on active service suspected of involvement with the gang have been arrested; the recently started investigation into the “action plan” allegedly prepared by certain elements within the military to discredit and split the elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) government are among recent developments that have helped raise hopes for an end to the political role of the military in Turkey.

It may be argued that in mid-2009 there are mainly two theories concerning the future of civilian-military relations in Turkey. The pessimistic theory maintains that as long as the mentality which regards the military as the real owner of the state and the country prevails among state elites and a part of civilian elites, and a substantial part of the electorate supports it, the political role of the military will persist. A recent national survey has indicated that those who believe “problems should sometimes be solved by the military rather than elected politicians” continue to constitute nearly a fourth of the electorate. (See: “Understanding the new Turkey,” A Konda report, November 2007.)

The optimistic theory, on the other hand, maintains that the view that the political role of the military not only leads to the neglect by the military of its proper duties, but also tarnishes the image and credibility of the military among the public. It is spreading not only among the people at large but even among the officer corps. According to those who subscribe to this theory, the Ergenekon investigation and trial have indicated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) will no longer tolerate coup plotters among their ranks. They maintain that repeated statements by Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ that the “TSK will not harbor personnel who are not committed to democracy and the rule of law” is an expression of that determination.

One of the main references of those who support the optimistic theory are statements by former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök, who is known not only to have supported EU reforms toward fulfilling the Copenhagen Political Criteria of membership, but also to have averted coup attempts in the 2003-2004 period. Earlier this year retired Gen. Özkök made the following remarkable statement: “The rising intellectual level of the TSK personnel, the evolution in communications technologies, democratic advances, improvements achieved in political, economic and other elements of national strength, increased participation of the Republic of Turkey in international organizations and institutions, the betterment of abilities in drawing lessons from previous experience have all helped to bring to an end the era of military coups. In the near future Turkey will become a country where all will mind their own business. I am convinced that the Turkish people have proven their maturity.” (Hürriyet, March 21, 2009)

Where lies the truth? Probably somewhere in between these theories. The kind of military coups that took place in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and even of the soft kind experienced in 1997 may really be over. The TSK may indeed no longer allow for “personnel not committed to democracy and the rule of law.” It may even be that from now on only the chief of general staff will speak for the military. But the political role of the military will endure as long as the military continues to regard itself as the chief representative of the national interest, and to defend its privileges.