Iran’s election: Free and fair?

It did not have to be this way, for a number of reasons. First of all, what is taking place in Iran runs contrary to the norms established by the revolution. Despite all its political problems and deficiencies, there were a couple of things about Iran and its 1970 revolution that always gave me hope about the country's political future. Although it's hard to romanticize what took place after the Islamic revolution of 1979, the sheer fact that the country witnessed a genuine people's revolution was a first for the Middle East. The revolution against the shah was the closest the region came to replacing the “ancient regime” with something more democratic. In fact, the mobilization against the regime in 1979 involved the students, the bazaar (commercial bourgeoisie), the workers, the Iranian Communist Party (TUDEH) and, of course, the clergy and religious class. Of all these elements, it was the clergy that was the most organized. In the chaos following the overthrow of the shah, the ayatollahs hijacked the revolution and shaped its outcome in their own image. What began as a revolution similar to the one France experienced in 1789 turned into an Islamic revolution.

Yet despite its illiberal tendencies, one characteristic that has always distinguished Iran from the crude dictatorships in much of the rest of the Middle East was its respect for the voice of the people. Nobody can argue that Iran was less democratic than Egypt, for instance. In Egypt, there is no suspense or surprise during elections. Everyone knows who will win. Not in Iran. Khatami's election in 1997 caught everyone by surprise. Hard-liners were stunned by the landslide election of a reformer who promised to bring rule of law and a more human face to the regime. But the establishment decided to play by the rules. They reasserted their control through cynical manipulation instead of an illegal coup. They did not falsify the election results. They even permitted a resounding reelection four years later. Instead, they just prevented Khatami from implementing his reform program.

But with the 2009 elections, Iran appears to have entered an entirely new phase. A credible challenger, Hossein Mousavi, had the potential to challenge the existing power structure. He ran an effective campaign as his “green wave” began to successfully mobilize youth and women. Many began calling it a “velvet revolution.” All this proved too much for the regime to digest, so they decided to act on election day.

First, mobile text messaging was deactivated nationwide, and security forces poured out into the streets in large numbers. National television began broadcasting prerecorded messages calling everyone to unite behind the winner. Later came the tactical ruse: The Mousavi campaign was informed officially that they had won the election. This served to temporarily lull them into complacency, but then the Ministry of Interior announced a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad. With each passing hour it became clearer that this election was neither free nor fair. For instance, unlike in previous elections, there was no breakdown of the vote by province, which would have provided a means to judge its credibility. The voting patterns announced by the government were identical in all parts of the country. This was clearly impossible. And less than 24 hours later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei publicly announced his congratulations to the winner, apparently confirming that the process was complete and irrevocable, contrary to constitutional requirements. Shortly thereafter, all mobile phones and other social networks were blocked, as well as major foreign news sources. Can anyone still claim this was a fair election?