And there could be no question that the state was re-designed on a level and scale that deserved this sort of re-labeling. After all, the majority of the changes that placed the Turkish military firmly within the state mechanism as a guardian standing at the helm of the civilian political arena were in fact the creation of May 27. And thus the uniformed bureaucracy, perceiving itself as the real guardian of the state, declared that it held in its hands the right to define the borders wherein civilians could act, and thus also held the right to tighten those borders when deemed necessary. And it was thus from that day forward that the founding will of the state and the image of Atatürk that represented it, which had been up until then perceived as "outside of politics," began to be perceived as "above politics."The act of overseeing and helping guide politics meant that ultimately, the military was to become a part of politics. And this reality gave way to critical results. The time spent on topics that were not actually part of the military's area of interest and expertise meant ultimately that their real duty was pushed to the back burner. When a spokesperson for the military's General Staff headquarters makes public statements while wearing civilian clothing, he may be easily supposed by many to be a political party's spokesperson, or even a civilian bureaucrat. I have no idea whether the allegations about the "military, which finds the mines it buried earlier and does nothing about clearing them," will be answered in this week's meeting. But there should definitely be a debate that ensues about the role that the military's real business being pushed to the back burner has played in our dependence on Israel for mine-clearing.
The 1960 insurrection's second strike carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was the forced retirement of 7,200 officers, 235 of whom were full generals. This wholesale house-cleaning of the military is described in detail in an article published in Aksiyon magazine and was in fact a move to alter the very genes of the Turkish military. According to the order being imposed on the nation, the first redesigning was to take place within the ranks of the military. It was in fact perhaps only through this reordering of the military that the coup planners were able to carry off their greatest act of intimidation: the execution of three politicians, one of whom was the prime minister.
We can label the most important result of the May 27 coup within the ranks of the military as the "Erdelhun syndrome." The name Erdelhun may have been forgotten by everyone other than those who are deeply interested in our recent history. In fact, the headlines about how the "Young officers are feeling discomfort with the situation," which we now clearly see was organized by the current suspects in the Ergenekon terror organization case, brought Rüştü Erdelhun, the former head of the Turkish military's General Staff who was tried after the 1960 coup on Yassıada, back to the spotlight for awhile. Faked letters and made-up news managed to give the message to the then-General Staff head, Hilmi Özkök, warning him "not to forget Erdelhun." The inhumane torture that Erdelhun was exposed to managed to strike the tone for the period after him. What May 27 showed many was not only how easily it was for military juntas to achieve their goals, but it also illustrated just how cruel these juntas and their methods could be. The civilians of the nation were threatened and intimidated by the hanging of the prime minister, while the Turkish military was threatened by the torture of the then- chief of general staff. The whole "Mustafa Muğlalı syndrome" is referred to often within the TSK, but in fact it is the Erdelhun syndrome that is more widespread and important. It was perhaps Özkök -- maybe with the help of his own luck -- that was the only commander that could break this chain.
Retired military officer and author of the book "The One-Hundred-Year Adventure of Democracy in Turkey," Dr. Erdoğan Günal, provides a very striking example for Aksiyon magazine of the traumas experienced by the Turkish military. He says: "For example, when Celal Alkoç was appointed from the rank of general to commander of the military, he wasn't even pleased with this promotion. To wit, he is only able to approach the new unit he will be commanding in the company of Col. Dündar Seyhan, an officer with close ties to the National Unity Committee [MBK]. He compares himself to a small child who has his hand held, despite being the commander of a great army."
There is a great deal to be learned and gained from laying every aspect of what happened on May 27, 1960 on the table now. There needs to be close examination of not only the effects on Turkish political life that resulted from this coup, but also of the breaking points and syndromes that it brought about in the military. At this point, we pay attention to only one side of the coin; everyone already knows about the second lieutenant who put out his cigarette on the face of full generals. But we need to remember that the trauma experienced by the newly promoted general who was accompanied to his new posting like a child heading to his first day of primary school was not a light matter, either.
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