President Obama inherited the Iraq and Afghan wars from George W. Bush, and he is doing his best to end both of them in order to focus on more pressing economic priorities. While Iraq is proving to be the easier case, the situation in Afghanistan is rapidly turning into a nightmare. The Obama administration's new Afghanistan strategy strikes most of the right notes, by emphasizing the critical importance of building up the Afghan National Army, without which nothing can be achieved in Afghanistan in the long term. The plan also rightly seeks a US exit strategy rather than "staying the course" and creating a modern, Western-style democracy in Afghanistan. Putting the Bush era mistakes and unilateralism aside, the Obama administration has also done something that should have been obvious from the very beginning: It reached out to Afghanistan's northern and western neighbors. After all, once the US eventually gets out, it is these regional powers that will have to try to manage Afghanistan's ongoing conflict.
Iran is critical in this regard. Because the US and Iran share the same basic agenda in Afghanistan, the US administration is quite rightly using talks on Afghanistan as an avenue towards improving the wider relationship with Tehran. Iranian support saved the opponents of the Taliban from complete defeat before 9/11 and will be essential to preserving whatever regime the US leaves behind in Kabul. Trade with Iran is vital to the Afghan economy, and aid from Iran could be vital to Afghan development.
Ironically, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, the real challenge for Washington is not cooperation with Iran but with Pakistan. As the new US strategy aptly recognizes, Afghanistan and Pakistan are now hopelessly interlinked. The AFPAK crisis, as it came to be known, needs a new strategy that deals with the Taliban insurgency rooted in the Pashtun populations of both countries. US pressure on the Afghan Taliban will achieve nothing without help from the Pakistani state and military against Taliban support on their soil.
As the last two weeks clearly illustrated, getting Pakistan to fight the Taliban is an enormous challenge. On this particular issue, the Obama administration still does not fully recognize the depths of the AFPAK problem. It is almost impossible to get Pakistan fully on board against the Taliban for two main reasons. First, the large majority of ordinary Pakistanis are bitterly opposed to Pakistan helping the US, especially if this involves the Pakistani army fighting the Taliban. Second, calculations by the Pakistani security establishment and intelligence services play a major part in limiting Pakistani actions against the Taliban.
Let's focus on the first factor. A democratically elected government cannot simply defy public opinion. The army has to recruit its soldiers from Pakistani villages and ask them to risk their lives. Pakistan can survive without American money and arms, but it cannot survive without the loyalty of its own citizens. For the majority of the population and the Pakistani security establishment the country is facing a much more serious threat than the Taliban: India. This is why an American strategy that focuses on the AFPAK problem without the Indian dimension will be missing a crucial part of the big picture. India, and more specifically Kashmir, was initially part of the portfolio of US special envoy Richard Holbrooke. Yet, when India refused any linkages, Holbrooke quickly complied and dropped India from the multilateral agenda. This was a big mistake.
Another area where Washington should improve its efforts is economic not military aid to Pakistan. This requires above all massive investment in infrastructure that will also generate jobs. $1.5 billion a year, the new US aid that is promised, is simply inadequate for a country of 170 million people. Washington is still spending $4 billion a month in Iraq. The Obama administration should not forget that Pakistan in the long term is far more important than both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Benzer Haberler 
