There is no doubt that even the news of the visit has already sparked such an atmosphere that the visit will be registered in the annals as an important step in "rebuilding the strategic partnership with Turkey." This is a phrase I borrowed from the Obama-Biden policy platform on Europe published before the election. Apart from the niceties pertaining to the fact that a US president is engaging with Turkey early on at the highest level, there are many issues that are expected to be on the table. It is highly likely that Obama will ask Turkey to increase its contribution to the NATO effort in Afghanistan, something that is being discussed internally within the Turkish decision-making structure. Provided that other NATO members contribute equally, it is not too farfetched to contemplate Turkey sharing more of the burden there.
Turkey will ask President Obama to use US influence on Greek Cyprus to convey a clear message to Nicosia that there will be a cost to the failure of the UN-sponsored talks. This is a relatively cost-free policy issue for Washington, but it must be highlighted as the talks are extremely significant this time.
The issue of US troop withdrawal from Iraq, the future of Iraq as well as thorny issues such as Kirkuk will be discussed. Provided the appropriate modalities are mutually agreed upon, there appears to be little resistance to a US withdrawal among the parties in the Turkish Parliament. Obviously, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) issue in light of the recent rapprochement with the northern Iraqi authorities -- possibly leading to the final eradication of the PKK menace from northern Iraq -- will be discussed.
Continued US support for Turkey's EU drive will be reiterated. Reviving the Israel-Syria talks under Turkish auspices or joint auspices is likely to be talked about. Naturally, the issue of Israel-Palestine as well as views on the Middle East will be shared. Iran -- and how to deal with this complicated issue -- is certainly going to be high on the US agenda, particularly in consideration of Turkey's UN Security Council seat.
Last but not least, the only pressing short-term issue will be brought up: the Armenian resolution in the US Congress and the president's statement on April 24. On this issue there are divergent views. Some in Washington believe that it will be difficult for Obama to retract his campaign promises, while others argue that he will follow what every president has done before him and act responsibly. Regardless of what he and his administration feel about this issue, there is little doubt that the current normalization effort with Armenia will figure prominently in everyone's mind. The visionary diplomacy undertaken by the two sides is historic and we want to believe that all sides understand the sensitivity and the opportunity at hand.
Despite the risks that the Armenian issue poses for Turkish-American relations, they have the potential to develop in a fashion that would remind us of the strong partnership both nations enjoyed for five decades. The US and Turkey have common interests in the region, although they sometimes choose to emphasize different means. Obama made a great start with his message to Al-Arabiya and Iran on Nevruz. His visit to Ankara may even add to the positive momentum he has garnered. The Middle East and the wider Islamic world will be eagerly watching how the visit will unfold.