Thus, for the first time after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin began pursuing active policies in the former Soviet Union territories, which it defined as its "near abroad." The only force dominating the Caucasus in the last 200 years was the Russians, who were decisive also in determining borders and the political, cultural and educational infrastructure there. In the face of Russian specialization in the Caucasus, the European-Atlantic world, i.e., the US and the EU, is considerably foreign to this geography.
Yet despite its expertise in the Caucasus, the Russian Federation failed to recover from the Soviet Union's fall, and the European-Atlantic alliance moved into former Eastern bloc countries as well as Black Sea and Caucasian countries at the Kremlin's expense. Southern Caucasus countries, especially Georgia, developed close relations with the EU and NATO following the Soviet Union's fall. But the European-Atlantic alliance's political expansion was halted by the Russian Federation's active policies in August 2008. The European-Atlantic alliance had to watch developments in the region with surprise and confusion in the post-Georgian crisis period.
In September 2008, the European-Atlantic alliance began to recover from this confusion. We see that the European-Atlantic alliance has begun looking for ways to promote relations with Armenia, and Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan on Sept. 6 in this framework. This can be seen as the alliance's attempt to lend support to Georgia, an alliance island in the region, via Armenia. The alliance also prepared a 3.4 billion euro economic aid program for Georgia. On Jan. 9, the US and Georgia inked a strategic cooperation agreement.
Yet the alliance is making a big mistake by backing the Saakashvili government instead of supporting Georgia. The US is repeating the same mistake they have made for years with Latin American countries. Their mistake is lending their support to administrations that comply with Western interests instead of supporting the people and democracy. Thus, Western aid serves only to maintain the Saakashvili government that sides with Republicans and courts Israel, not Georgia. Thus, Republicans at the helm, Washington began its Latin Americanization of Georgia.
On the other hand, the Georgian nation and intellectuals only want their countries to Europeanize, not Latin Americanize. In other words, Georgia wants to be a member of the EU. They want parliamentary democracy to replace the presidential system inherited from the Soviet era and Georgian integration with the EU. For this reason, the policies of the Republican US and the EU began to conflict with each other. Viewing the southwestern Caucasus from the perspective of Saakashvili and his government only boosts Russian Federation influence in the region. If Obama's Democrats backpedal from the Republicans' southwestern Caucasus blunder and lend support to democracy in Georgia instead of to the Saakashvili government, this will be in the best interests of the European-Atlantic alliance.
In the Obama era, a new Georgia will be needed because a Georgia that has not solved its problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia means a country that is no longer a reliable energy corridor from the East to the West. Accordingly, a pro-Western Georgian leader who can establish more balanced relations with the Russian Federation, who will waive sovereignty claims on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to further the country's integration with the EU and NATO and who is closer to Democrats than Republicans is needed.
The US and EU have started to review their Abkhazia and South Ossetia policies. The Saakashvili government still pursues a strict isolation policy toward these countries. This policy only boosts the Russian Federation's influence in the region. Obama should develop clearer policies concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We must say that Georgia may become member of NATO and the EU if it waives its claims on these countries.
If the European-Atlantic alliance continues to lend support to the Saakashvili administration, the Russian Federation may launch a new political initiative geared toward the Georgian intellectuals and people. The Kremlin has already started a new political initiative toward Azerbaijan and Armenia. In his second term, which began Oct. 15, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev began pursuing new policies designed to avoid offending the Russian Federation. For these reasons we can expected that Obama's policies will seek to thaw the ice between Armenia and Turkey and open the border gates between the two in order to draw Armenia toward the European-Atlantic alliance. Moreover, he will push for solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
In the face of the Kremlin's active policies, Obama and the Democrats need new policies in the Caucasus.