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ŞAHİN ALPAY s.alpay@todayszaman.com Columnists

Eradicate ‘Ergenekon,’ consolidate democracy


The trial against the "Ergenekon" gang, involving retired and current military officers, journalists, lawyers, academics, members of the mafia and others accused of creating chaos in the country through bombings and killings to pave the ground for an ultranationalist military coup, began last week.

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A proper understanding of the case is important, particularly in view of the arguments put forward by opponents of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and by sympathizers with the coup plotters to present it as an attempt by the current government to suppress all opposition. Such arguments only aim at distorting the facts, rendering the trial ineffective and help the defendants escape from justice. In reality, the Ergenekon trial is a historic opportunity for Turkey to eradicate what has been called the "deep state" and consolidate democracy in Turkey. Let me explain why.

The constitution adopted in 1961 in the wake of the first military intervention in 1960, placed democracy in Turkey under the tutelage or supervision of state elites led by the military. The National Security Council (MGK), created by that constitution and bringing together military and civilian leaders, assumed powers above and beyond the elected government. Beginning in the 1960s, Turkey increasingly found itself influenced by Cold War rivalries. A coup attempt on March 9, 1971, by a nationalist left military and civilian junta, was averted by the military high command which seized power on March 12, 1971. Constitutional amendments that followed further enhanced the powers of the MGK.

The slow-motion civil war between ultra- left and right elements in the latter half of the 1970s led to the seizure of power in 1980 by the military high command. The constitution drawn up by the military, adopted in 1982, further increased the powers of the MGK, effectively turning Turkey into a national security state, where ultimate power rested with the military. The military not only assumed responsibility for the security of the state, but also gained substantial influence over domestic and foreign policy. Policies were defined secretly and implemented through covert channels. Public debate was restricted through censorship and intimidation. Any means to control and destroy the enemies of the state were justified by the threats of separatism and religious fundamentalism.  

The Turkish public became aware of the existence of a "deep state," a state which was not bound by the rule of law, following a car accident near the town of Susurluk in western Turkey in 1996. This is easy enough to research on the Internet. The accident led to the revelations that the state security and intelligence organizations had organized and used a gang composed of elements of the mafia and convicted fugitives to exterminate people believed to be providing financial and other assistance to the Kurdish separatist terror organization, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). It seemed as if the "deep state" had decided to put a stop to the activities of the gang, but the activities had gotten out of control and it had started killing for its own interests mainly in drug trafficking and gambling. Some of the henchmen of the gang were arrested and imprisoned, but the investigation was suppressed and the organizers of the gang remained in the dark.

The Susurluk gang was undoubtedly an operation of the state. The investigation against it indicates that the Ergenekon gang is a deep-state operation similar to the Susurluk gang. There are certain continuities between the two, some members of the former reappearing in the latter. The Ergenekon gang, unlike the Susurluk gang, has been organized in a bottom-up manner with the aim of paving the ground for the seizure of state power by a junta composed of both civilian and military elements, reminiscent of the aborted March 9, 1971 coup attempt.

There are, on the other hand, also serious differences between the aborted coup of 1971 and the Ergenekon initiative. The former had a very limited popular base among civil society, and no capability for mass mobilization. The latter has, however, displayed great capacity for mass mobilization based on the exploitation of fears among the public concerning secularism and separatism, and has enjoyed sizable support among the media, nongovernmental organizations, business groups and political parties. The Susurluk gang was the suspension of the rule of law by the state itself. The Ergenekon gang has aimed to seize the state using a junta and putting an end to democratic rule. The Susurluk gang had the backing of the state up to the point when it lost control of itself. The Ergenekon gang has aimed at the state, plotting for the assassination of not only the prime minister and a Nobel prize-winning novelist, but also the chiefs of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The Ergenekon investigation and trial would surely not been possible if it had not been backed by the military high command.

27 October 2008, Monday
ŞAHİN ALPAY
   
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Columnists
ABDULHAMİT BİLİCİ
ABDULLAH BOZKURT
ALİ BULAÇ
ALİ H. ASLAN
AMANDA PAUL
ANDREW FINKEL
ASIM ERDİLEK
AYŞE KARABAT
BEJAN MATUR
BERİL DEDEOĞLU
BERK ÇEKTİR
BÜLENT KENEŞ
BÜLENT KORUCU
CHARLOTTE MCPHERSON
DOĞU ERGİL
EKREM DUMANLI
EMRE USLU
ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN
FATMA DİŞLİ ZIBAK
FİKRET ERTAN
GÜRKAN ZENGİN
HASAN KANBOLAT
HÜSEYİN GÜLERCE
İBRAHİM KALIN
İBRAHİM ÖZTÜRK
İHSAN DAĞI
İHSAN YILMAZ
KATHY HAMILTON
KERİM BALCI
KLAUS JURGENS
LALE KEMAL
MEHMET KAMIŞ
MICHAEL KUSER
MUHAMMED ÇETİN
MÜMTAZER TÜRKÖNE
NICOLE POPE
ÖMER TAŞPINAR
ORHAN KEMAL CENGİZ
PAT YALE
ŞAHİN ALPAY
SELÇUK GÜLTAŞLI
SUAT KINIKLIOĞLU
YAVUZ BAYDAR