Bumping into Turkey somewhere down the road

President Bush announced last week that his administration would use "US aircraft, as well as naval forces, to deliver humanitarian and medical supplies" to Georgia. I'm sure he wasn't aware of Turkey's special geographic location nor how the 1936 Montreux Convention dictates the flow of any foreign naval ships through the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Nor had his administration approached Ankara beforehand.

With bitter memories of the Turkish Parliament's March 1, 2003 rejection of US troop entry into Iraq from within Turkish borders, some hawks -- such as Ariel Cohen of the conservative Heritage Foundation -- were quick to blame the Turkish government for not supporting US relief efforts. In fact most of the blame should have gone to the Bush administration for having failed to do the necessary homework before making such a high-profile commitment.

Turkey has always, without exception, vigorously enforced the terms of Montreaux. The convention limits the tonnage of foreign military ships through the straits and in the Black Sea. It also mandates a waiting period of up to 15 days after initial notification. Even when Turkey itself was hit by a devastating earthquake in 1999, Ankara refused to allow entry through the Dardanelles of a US hospital ship not complying with the tonnage rules.

Ankara's sensitivity about the topic stems not only from an obsession with complying with international treaties. Having suffered much in fights among great powers over control of the Black Sea, the Montreux Convention has since saved Turkey from a great amount of trouble. So this is not a matter of lack of courtesy either toward the US or toward Georgia. Turkey has nothing to gain from blocking aid from the US to Georgia, both friendly nations. Few people in Washington realize that the Montreux Convention is a defining treaty for the modern Turkish Republic.

It would be unfair to expect Turkey to violate what is in a sense the territorial integrity of the Black Sea while at the same time calling on Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia. Fortunately, crisis-mongers in both nations were unable to prevail, and negotiations between the parties resulted for the time being in authorization of three US naval ships.

One would expect excellent communication and cooperation on this and other issues between Turkey and the US, given the claimed stature of their relationship. But especially at the higher echelons of Washington, people seem to forget about Turkey until they bump into it somewhere down the road. And Ankara's rulers occasionally forget that the US is Turkey's stated "strategic partner." If you hear expressions like "came out of the blue" or "we are surprised" regarding Ankara's new initiative to establish a cooperation pact in the Caucasus, then that says something about the depth (!) of consultations among these supposed "strategic partners."

In the Shared Vision Statement of July 2006, the US and Turkey declared that they agreed "to translate our shared vision into common efforts through effective cooperation and structured dialogue." The Caucasus crisis, if nothing else, has proven such a translation has not yet been realized.

Sharing the same strategic vision does not necessarily mean tactics will always be identical. For example, Washington and Ankara share similar strategic aims in regards to the Iranian nuclear issue. As a matter of fact, supporting "diplomatic efforts" on Iran's nuclear program, including the P5+1 initiative, was part of the Shared Vision Statement. But the gross divergence in diplomatic tactics even on such a vital strategic issue raises serious questions about the prospects of a strategic partnership between the two nations. American officials do not hide their discontent with high-level traffic between Ankara and Tehran, the last but not least being Iranian President Ahmedinejad's recent visit to Turkey. If you ask Turkish officials, they say they'd prefer to engage rather than further isolate Tehran.