Now, those who observe Turkish foreign policy will see conjectural ups and downs in an upward graph that can be flexed to the maximum with respect to national interests. Turkish policy will necessarily be made an unpredictable one. Every step we take to maximize Turkey's national interests will come as a surprise both to the country and to the international community. We know that this is the hard, risky and uncomfortable way. Yet we do not regard it as more dangerous than a static foreign policy mentality in our highly volatile region and in a world where everything changes lightning-fast..."When I examine the foreign policy pursued by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) since the very day it assumed office, I see that what my friend told me has happened and continues to happen. That Turkey has developed its own foreign policy even on the most contentious issues despite the fact that it never followed an independent foreign policy during the Cold War era -- except for the 1974 peacemaking operation in Cyprus -- comes as a shock to those who live in the comfort of the past. Those who failed to register that a "new Turkey" emerged with the new government in 2002 have always experienced this shock and surprise; when they first heard about Parliament's refusal to approve the motion of March 1, 2003; or when they saw Hamas leader Khalid Mashaal visiting Ankara; or when Turkey hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in İstanbul despite international efforts to isolate them.
The activism and potential for surprise of Turkish policy are not limited to those policies found to be divergent by Western powers. I am sure that these powers were taken by surprise and even offended by the "Iraq's neighbors' initiative" launched by Turkey in order to prevent the war after it refused to give the green light to the US effort to open a northern front before the war erupted. They were probably also baffled by a Turkey that tried to start a conciliation initiative between Afghanistan and Pakistan, or between Syria and Israel, or among Iraqi groups. Today, they are equally surprised by the Caucasus Cooperation Platform initiated by the Erdoğan government while armed conflict was ongoing in Georgia and South Ossetia. Turkey manages to astonish Western diplomacy-makers and communities with original moves entailed by its national and regional interests and security.
For some time, some groups in the US and in our country have been trying to cast shadow over Turkey's initiative to ensure cooperation in the Caucasus by saying that they fail to understand what Turkey is trying to do and even that they find it dangerous. However in my opinion, this initiative is a good example of how to make a regional opportunity out of a regional crisis. While the international community was striving to put a cease-fire in place to end the armed conflict, Turkey stepped forward with a project to ensure cooperation among the parties of the conflict and other rival countries in the region, which is totally the correct thing to do, in my opinion.
This is because wartime serves as the best time when the parties involved can understand what a slippery thing peace is. For this reason, ongoing armed conflicts make such initiatives not only more meaningful, but also more feasible than ever. It is perfectly understandable why Turkey has put forward an alternative project in the redesign of the regional equilibrium that changed with the developments in South Ossetia. In the final analysis, any development in this region has an impact on Turkey. This initiative even has the potential of melting the ice between Turkey and Armenia and between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Moreover, this initiative may serve as an opportunity for removing the Caucasus from the list of unresolved issues between Russia and the West, which will inevitably confront each other via Poland and Ukraine. Turkish diplomacy does not deserve criticism but rather thanks for developing a "language of hope" as an alternative to the "language of war and confrontation" commonly employed in the region.
As for the other topic: Before anything else, I must point out that the criticism concerning the visit to Turkey by the leader of Iran, an independent country with which we have historical relations and common interests, does not deserve any response. This is particularly so given the fact that Turkey employs all of its good bilateral relations in the service of international peace, security and stability...
As for al-Bashir's visit, it is naturally difficult to deliver a clear opinion about it. However we all know that Western sources do not always develop correct policies relying on unreliable intelligence, and even they distort the truth when this serves their interests. Of course, to see a dictator who ordered or condoned the massacres that amounted to genocide visit İstanbul bothers me like any other Turk. Nevertheless, the correctness of the attempt to put the entire blame on certain groups without fully uncovering the behind-the-scenes of the tragic events in Darfur is obviously dubious.
Recalling the fact that Sudan has been paralyzed for many years by armed Christian dissident groups in the south of the country, which is rich with energy resources, and knowing that the Darfur tragedy emerged after this issue was solved are enough to show that the Sudan issue is not as clear as the West describes it. This lack of clarity adds support to the argument that all this occurred since al-Bashir, who, in my opinion, should be declared guilty at least for his failure to prevent the atrocities in his country, refused to open his country's energy resources to utilization by Western corporations. Moreover, just like the US, neither Turkey nor Sudan is signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and despite all ethical considerations, the decision made by the ICC prosecutor does not bind Turkey legally.