Perhaps the most remarkable achievements of the AKP government are, however, in the sphere of foreign policy. With AKP-led reforms, Turkey "sufficiently" fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and started accession negotiations with the EU at the end of 2005. Thanks to the AKP government's support for the UN-sponsored plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, Ankara can no longer be held responsible for failure to find a solution on the island. I believe that an even more significant achievement in foreign policy is the "soft power" gained by Ankara as a regional power that promotes peace, stability and (yes also) democracy in the greater Middle East.
Remember the 1990s. In the latter half of that decade Turkey's only friend in the region was Israel, and Ankara was in conflict with almost all of its neighbors. It was relying mainly on military threats as a foreign policy tool. There was talk of an impending war on "two-and-a-half fronts" (Greece, Syria and, of course, the Kurdistan Worker's Party [PKK]). The world perceived the PKK not as a terrorist organization, but as Kurdish "freedom fighters."
Today the situation is far different. Turkey has friendly relations with nearly all neighboring countries. Bilateral problems with Athens have yet to be solved, but both state-to-state and society-to-society relations with Greece have improved immensely. Compared with the previous decade, relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran have markedly changed. Friendly relations with all of these neighbors prevail, and they are cooperating with Ankara against the PKK instead of manipulating it against Turkey. Relations with Armenia have not yet normalized, and the Cyprus problem is yet to be settled. But there is at least movement in both directions. Ankara has managed to avoid involvement in the invasion of Iraq and yet still maintains close relations with the US.
With rare exception, Turkey today has earned the trust of all governments as well as non-state actors in the region from Morocco to Afghanistan, enabling it to contribute to stability and to the solution of conflicts. Ankara is currently a facilitator for dialogue and conflict resolution between Syria and Israel, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and Afghanistan, between parties in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, even between Iran and the West. The role played by Ankara is surely appreciated both in Brussels and (neocons aside) in Washington.
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is coming to Istanbul on Aug. 14 for a working visit to meet with Turkish President Abdullah Gül. The visit may hopefully contribute to a resolution of the international crisis with Iran over its nuclear program. Ankara surely has no sympathy for the "theodemocratic" (partly theocratic and partly democratic) regime in Tehran. But Iran is Turkey's neighbor. Maintaining friendly relations with Tehran is essential not only for securing its respect for Turkey's regime and integrity, but also for economic reasons. Iran is a major supplier for Turkey's increasing energy needs, and a growing market for Turkish industries.
The major issue in the talks between Gül and Ahmadinejad will surely be Iran's nuclear program. Ankara is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thus against Iran acquiring them. But, rightly or wrongly, Ankara does not object to the development of nuclear energy by Iran or any other nation. For this reason it supports Iran conducting its nuclear program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ankara is, however, strongly against the bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities by the US or Israel, since that would contribute to further escalation of conflicts in the region.
It finally has to be emphasized that the contribution of Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision, wisdom and energy to Turkey's new foreign policy is substantial. He is the prime example of how highly competent and qualified advisors are an invaluable asset to governments.
Note: This weekly column will be away for two weeks.