What if the AKP is closed?

By banning the AKP, the Constitutional Court would not only violate the convention, but also its own principles regarding the freedom of organization -- elaborated as recently as July 1 in its decision to refuse to ban the pro-Kurdish Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR). That decision stated that political parties are indispensable for a democracy. Their different solutions to the country's problems are a natural consequence of their political functions. The discourse of political parties is protected by the freedom of expression as long as it does not pose a clear and present danger to the democratic regime. Political parties cannot be banned as long as they do not seriously threaten democracy.

The AKP leadership has, since the initiation of the case to close down the party, behaved responsibly and done its best to avoid -- as much as possible -- damage to Turkey's economy and foreign policy interests. The AKP government has refrained from amending the rules governing political parties to bring them in line with EU norms, which would have rendered its closure impossible. It may be expected that the AKP leadership will continue to behave responsibly, whatever the verdict. Irrespective of the AKP leadership's behavior, however, a decision to ban the party risks the further polarization of the country and the lessening of prospects for national reconciliation.

A closure decision also risks highly negative consequences for the Turkish economy by increasing uncertainty about the future and deterring investment, with the most unwanted consequences of falling growth rates, increasing unemployment and poverty. Those who will conclude that pursuing democratic and peaceful politics is not allowed in Turkey will be more likely to assume radical positions. If, like the AKP, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is also closed down, Turkey's Kurds are likely to conclude that their political preferences have no relevance and the ranks of those who adopt violent methods are likely to swell.

Turkey's hard-earned prestige as a force for peace, stability, and democracy in its region will suffer, and it will be perceived not as a democracy on the road to joining the European Union, but rather as another authoritarian Middle Eastern regime. Those in the EU who oppose Turkish membership will acquire further evidence for their arguments. Ankara is most likely to miss the recently arisen opportunities for solving the Cyprus problem and normalizing relations with Armenia, and its hopes of being elected to the UN Security Council will surely fade. The most severe consequence of a closure verdict in this context concerns the message sent to the Muslim world. Islamist movements are likely to conclude that they will be excluded from the democratic process even if they adopt democracy and secularism and to further radicalize.

A decision to close down the AKP is not even likely to serve the aims and interests of those who support it. The party that replaces the AKP will surely decide to go to the polls as soon as possible and will most likely win an even stronger mandate, rendering the political opposition even more marginal. It will not even be possible to eliminate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, since there are no rules to stop Erdoğan from being re-elected as an independent or to stop Gül from serving the full length of his term as president.

The prospects for the consolidation of democracy and secularism are much stronger, on the other hand, if the court refuses to close down the AKP. Why? That is the topic of another column.