Of course, the demand comes from peripheral circles. The bureaucratic center opposes it. Modernity rapidly leaves everything outdated. Even if we blame modernity for the ongoing crisis, in the final analysis we are living in a modern situation along with the entire world. Whether we opt to fight against this or to adapt to the modern situation, our final decision will be somehow relevant to this "situation" and we have to make our decision about the situation under the conditions of modernity. The question is how Turkey will be restructured. The answer to the question varies greatly depending on the worldviews of opinion holders.
The circles that favor Turkey's integration with the West make references to Western standards for the restructuring process. If Turkey is to be restructured, they hold that it has to follow the path of the West in every field. The EU process will do this. The problem is that Turkey is actually moving away from the EU. Of course, Turkey must benefit from the European experience in the restructuring process, but the existence of other options and experiences should not be forgotten.
Debate over reform or restructuring has been going on for 150 years, and it seems that it will last forever. There are two important points that are often overlooked. First, there are drastic differences between the historical development of Turkey and the historical experience of the European countries. If Turkey feels the need to follow a certain model in its reform process, Russia and Iran are better examples than Europe.
A superficial review will reveal that Turkey, Russia and Iran made decisions to introduce dramatic reforms almost simultaneously over the past 200 years. Each of these three countries introduced similar reforms. There are amazing similarities between their constitutional movements. When Iran moved to a constitutional system in 1906, Turkey declared a regime based on rule of the constitution two years later. Russia experienced the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, whereas Turkey became a republic in 1923. In the same period, the Pehlevi era began in Iran.
Turkey's shift to a multiparty system, Stalin's death and the developments following the movement led by Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran are neither irrelevant nor independent of each other. Historical breakdowns were experienced in these three countries at the same time, and these breakdowns led to dramatic reforms.
The latest examples of these striking similarities can be found in the last decades. First, there was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The revolution dramatically changed the regime and the system, including its administrative, social and economic institutions. Ten years later, the Soviet Union experienced a great transformation: the perestroika and glasnost era led by Mikhail Gorbachev began. The Soviet system collapsed and was replaced by the Russian Federation.
What happened in Iran and Russia are not ordinary. Scholars and intellectuals in Turkey failed to appreciate the significance of these events simply because they were too busy with the developments in Europe.
Turkey took the first step in the decisions it made on Jan. 24, 1979. This was followed by the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup, but important decisions for reform were made in 1983. However, the reform process was halted following President Turgut Özal's death. The Feb. 28 "postmodern coup" process was an attempt to reverse Turkey's experiences of the recent past, but it failed. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is a democratic response on the part of the peripheral actors to the center's insistence on domination of the status quo.
Most of the reasons for Turkey's current troubles should be sought in this. But it is obvious that Turkey will either introduce the required reforms or come to the brink of collapse. It is no longer possible to reverse the natural course of history or to maintain domination of status quo.
Benzer Haberler 
