Serving as an energy corridor for Caspian hydrocarbon resources reaching Europe still remains an important part of its strategy of benefiting from its geographic location provided that it can take some portion of gas and oil passing via its soil. But this policy faces certain snags.
The latest report released by the State Planning Organization (DPT) on Turkey's energy policy projections for the five-year period between 2008 and 2012 has focused on Turkey's supply security, especially in electricity generation.
As Turkey has been using 50 percent of the gas it has been importing mainly from Russia and Iran to generate electricity, utilization of renewable energy resources at a maximum level becomes highly important to reduce the burden on generating costly electricity.
The DPT report stresses the importance of concentrating on renewable energy resources while taking measures to decrease dependence on imported energy resources such as oil and gas, improving electricity trade with neighboring countries, increasing energy efficiency and fighting against the illegal use of electricity.
All in all, the plan gives utmost importance to regulating the domestic market for an effective utilization of the country's already-scarce energy resources with an approach based on the assumption that Turkey's energy needs will soar in the future largely due to the high growth of production and population. (Today's Zaman, Nov. 20).
Turkey's determination in going ahead with an energy deal with neighboring Iran despite certain reservations raised by its close ally, the US, stems mainly from concerns of finding ways in which Ankara can reduce the already existing pressure of a gap between supply and demand.
Ideally, the US, which is urging the international community and its allies not to forge business ties with Teheran -- moves that encourage Iran to pursue its alleged nuclear arms production plan, would not like Turkey to have business ties with Iran at all.
But conscious of Turkey's growing energy needs and in particular in electricity, the US has appeared to have acknowledged to a certain extent Turkey's cooperation in electricity trade with Iran provided that it does not involve investment.
Despite US reservations, anxious over meeting Turkey's energy supplies, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler signed a $1.5 billion agreement in Ankara on Tuesday with his Iranian counterpart, Parviz Fattah, for the upgrade of existing power transmission lines and the construction of a new line between the two nations. This deal is expected to require an investment to be made by Turkey in Iran too.
As a sign of Turkish determination to go ahead with forging energy ties with Iran, Güler said "We (Turkey) will continue to sign agreements with Iran, including ones for natural gas."
"Most naturally, we are prepared; we know of these," Güler briefly responded, when reminded by reporters of the fact that deals between third countries and Iran are subject to US sanction.
"At this point, our country's interests are above everything. These efforts should by no means be considered a reaction, this is an action," he noted.
On the other hand, despite a determined policy of forging energy cooperation with Iran, Turkey at the same time is well aware of Teheran's policy of not living up to its commitments. Frequent cuts of Iranian gas supplies to Turkey mainly in winter are one of many examples of Turkish experiences in dealing with Iran.
Many Turkish energy experts caution Ankara about energy cooperation with Iran, urging it to safeguard its energy supply security in dealings with this country.
In the meantime, Ankara has been seeking to strengthen its position as an energy corridor of supplying Europe with alternative energy sources other than Russia, provided that it could take some of those hydrocarbon resources for its own use.
In the beginning of my article, I talked about snags that Ankara has been facing in taking some of the oil and gas passing or planned to transit its soil.
There has been an ongoing disagreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey over Ankara's demand for 15 percent of Azeri gas lately being pumped to Greece via Turkey.
Azerbaijanis fear that Turkey may sell this portion of gas that it seeks to buy to third parties at a higher price, undermining the Azeri ability to control gas prices. But Turkey, for its part, is demanding 15 percent of the gas to meet its growing domestic energy needs rather than becoming a hub, at least in the short term, by storing the extra gas intended to be sold to third countries.
That kind of intense energy negotiation tell us, among other things, how vital a concerned nation will play the energy game to safeguard its own national interest. Turkey appears to have learned some of the lessons from its past mistakes, in particular during the long process that culminated with construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.