This configuration has served the interests of the “West,” because it made it easy to understand who was in which bloc. No one seemed to be distracted by Saddam Hussein’s authoritarianism and his famous cruelty. When Iraq failed in its war against Iran and tried to invade Kuwait without acceptable reason, this view came to an end. Iraq couldn’t convince the world about the necessity of the invasion of Kuwait. In fact, when a country invades the territory of another country, it’s quite difficult to convince everybody. Nevertheless, while planning to attack Kuwait, Saddam was slightly encouraged by the global powers who finally decided to say that Saddam’s act was a great mistake. In brief, when the situation was modified and when Saddam’s mission in Iraq and in the region ended, he became an unwanted leader and this incited him to make mistakes.
The modification of the international situation also affected the US, which was no longer obliged to play the role of the “pole” as the bipolar system had expired. The US insistence on pursuing its influence over the system made George W. Bush the president and transformed Iraq into his obsession. That means the conjectural change helped other actors of the system to establish new power balances and their activities laid the ground for the American mistakes.
A similar situational analysis is valid for Turkey too. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey tried to establish a new diplomatic position. The original intention was to maintain peaceful relations with the West and the East, including Russia, at the same time. Relations between Turkey and Russia have developed, especially in the energy area and with the improvement of the economic ties that helped Turkey to approach the EU’s positions. Unfortunately this period has finished quickly, even though it was supported by domestic developments and global actors’ wills. Because the situation changed again and the tendencies toward conflict and competitive relations grew stronger, the establishment of peaceful relations by Turkey with the East and Russia became unnecessary. Simultaneously nationalistic feelings, which are useful to support this ambiance, have become more powerful in Turkish domestic policy. This creates a similar position with states making political and diplomatic mistakes. As in the cases of Iraq or the US, people with a militaristic rhetoric became more influential in Turkey.
The principal deficiency of people making mistakes is their fear of losing their positions because of the modification of the situation. This forces them to feel that they are obliged to make those mistakes. This obligation is connected to the domestic balances and this makes the external problems be seen as an internal problem. However every step in foreign policy should be made after an analysis emphasizing external balances. One mustn’t forget that Saddam and US President George W. Bush both became victims of their own mistakes.
Any intervention in northern Iraq contains the risk of opening an unfavorable path before Turkey both in domestic and international policy. Maybe the vital question is: why do those who are doomed to lose continue playing these games?