Turkey’s general “policy” theory is that financial and ideological support of terrorist organizations is assured by NGOs or different institutions in Europe. If this is correct and if we think that nobody works in Turkey’s favor on the European continent, then we can say that terrorism is one of the main factors determining EU-Turkey relations. The reality is that these kinds of institutions are not illegal in Europe and so the fact that Turkey is obliged to adapt its legislation to European laws doesn’t make things easier. This leaves us with two possibilities:First of all Turkey can try to eradicate the “external support” by using European legislation and methods. In other words it can fight its “European battle” in Europe. This policy necessitates more effort from Turkey in order to obtain full EU membership. It also necessitates Europe’s will to integrate Turkey.
The second path is to take every supportive action for the terrorist organization by the several European groups as hostile acts of the part of the EU, and keep fighting it from the outside. This method will drive Turkey away from full EU membership and will politically define it as an Asiatic country.
Terrorism is also one of the main determinants of relations with the US. The main issue is to find out whether Turkey’s fight against terrorism will be conducted in partnership with the US or in spite of the US. Turkey insists that if the US wants Turkish cooperation in Iraq, then it should destroy terrorist groups in northern Iraq. If not Turkey makes clear that it will do this unilaterally. In other words Turkey is saying “if you’re not with us, you’re against us.” What is odd is that US motivation in the war against terrorism was never fully understood in Turkey and nor were Turkey’s reasons fully understood by the US administration. This is why Turkey’s will to conduct a military operation in northern Iraq is seen as a cover for other political aims. Apparently it is understood as the implication of Turkey’s choice to be with or against the US in Iraq’s reconstruction.
Despite these remaining doubts in US policy, Turkey prefers not to act “in spite of” the US. Recent developments in Turkey and in the northern Iraqi context promote Turkish-US rapprochement, at least on the operational level. Actually the US is almost a hostage of the northern Iraqi authorities and Turkey could resolve this problem, but acting alone it may put itself at too great a risk. While in fact every operation in northern Iraq will put Turkey in a risky position, whether or not it is conducted with the US cooperation, it is certain that in any case a cross-border operation of this nature will serve US interests.
In the event of a military operation Turkey may face bigger problems inside the country than outside. This is why Ankara should better calculate who is capable of supporting Turkey should domestic complications arise. Moreover perhaps the US has had enough of being called on for help because of “domestic threats” and may even contribute to eliminating those who keep calling for his help.
Turkey has to establish strong ties and clear political channels with the US and the EU. It has the capacity to do so. The challenge now is to determine who will be in charge when this capacity is used.