Northern Iraq polemic in Ankara

While a dialogue of deaf between the two capitals still continues, the issue has reached a different dimension recently. Now, the debate has turned into a terrible competition of nationalism. The picture that is being drawn shows as if the military front wanting a cross-border operation and the government refusing it.

Instead of analyzing the benefits and risks of a military operation, there are circles who are using the difference of opinion between the military and the AK Party government as an opportunity to advance their personal agenda. It is used often in ongoing anti-AK Party campaign in Turkey and abroad. Some people like Michael Rubin have gone as far as linking the government’s stance to AK Party’s close ties with Barzani.

Is there really a big difference between government and the Turkish military? During a press conference on April 12, Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt clearly indicated that he supported a military operation. But he did not say whether he has made any requests from the government. However, during a TV program after the suicide bombing in Ankara, Prime Minister Erdoğan assured the audience that Parliament would support the Turkish Armed Forces if it requested a cross-border operation. Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç also said Parliament would support such a request.

I personally believe it is unfair to hold the government’s stance as a tactical response to the recent terrorist activity. A while before the bombing in Ankara, I asked a high-level foreign diplomat who is very familiar with the issue about the government’s stand on a military operation. The answer was not much different than what Erdoğan says today: “It depends on the purpose and the nature of the operation. Would it be to punish or to occupy? Or would it be just an air bombardment? Operations intended to punish have been conducted in the past, and there are debates that a similar operation may be carried out again. No one in Ankara has yet said no for such a scenario.”

Besides, the problem with the cross-border operation isn’t with Ankara’s stance. The problem is the refusal of de facto administrator of Iraq -- the US, the Iraqi government in Baghdad and the local Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. Given that, shouldn’t both civil and military officials focus on persuading these actors refusing a military operation instead of arguing with each other? Have those who support a military operation calculated the strategic costs if Turkey is left to face America as well? I am sure the first step of such strategy should be mending Ankara’s recent chaotic political image in the world. There is no way a country, where the civilians don’t trust its military, can persuade any other actor.

Hence, such a vital national issue should not be at the center of manipulative political debates. This does not mean cross-border operation is good and must be launched immediately. In contrast, it means we must first openly discuss the pros and cons of an operation under today’s circumstances, especially since there are grave concerns about the benefits of pervious operations.

My personal view is that Turkey has the right to stage a limited operation that strictly targets PKK elements. How such an operation could be launched or whether it would be beneficial is up to military experts to decide. America, which traveled thousands of miles for the sake of fighting terror, and Kurdish leaders who have failed to eliminate terrorist activities in their region, should not reject such an operation.

However, an operation that is not supported by the US and the local Kurdish administration may have irreparable costs for Turkey: A clash with the Kurdish administration will offer great opportunity for Barzani to retaliate, and it will deepen Kurdish-Turkish animosity. International organizations, in particular the UN, may intervene. The process toward Kurdish independence may be accelerated. Those who are interested in the issue should remember the results of Serbia’s intervention in Kosovo and Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor. Also, consider the effect news of Turkish soldiers clashing with peshmergas will have on Turkey.

I guess now we came to the point where then-Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök warned that he hoped Turkish MPs stance to stay away from the Iraqi war would not prompt a war between Turkey and the occupation forces in the region, shortly after the March 1, 2003 refusal of Parliament to American demands. Let’s hope that a common ground can be found among Ankara, Washington and Iraqi actors to ease that tension.