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While evaluating issues on the agenda with a foreign diplomat who is very familiar with Turkey, one of his remarks was very striking.
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He continuously highlighted the fact that events in Iraq would be a determining factor for the developments in Turkey. The flow of events in Iraq will be as important for Turkey’s democratic recovery as it will be for Turkey’s relations with the West in general and with Washington in particular. It was a good chance that yesterday, I was able to learn Ankara’s most recent perspective on Iraq from a top-level official who is in a very good position to evaluate the situation. I would like to briefly relay some of the important points underlined during our conversation: Partition threat: From a legal point of view, Ankara sees the risk of partition in Iraq is less today than it was yesterday because America has understood the risks a divided Iraq will have on Iraqi people, on the region and on the interests of Washington. It is also accepted that the dialogue between Ankara and Washington is much healthier than in the past. Besides, in the most recent meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh and in similar gatherings, all declarations that were agreed upon refer to the territorial integrity of Iraq. However, the sectarian clash in Iraq can still pave the way for partition. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive view on how to resolve the sectarian problem. For Ankara, withdrawal of American soldiers now would put Iraq into a bloodier civil war. Clash among Turkmens: Until recently, there was grave concern that Turkmens may be targeted by Kurdish groups. The recent events in Talafar added a new factor to that: Turkmens targeting Turkmens. Talafar is geographically important for every group in Iraq, and there is growing tension between Sunni and Shiite Turkmens, who feel isolated from society. In deed, it was expected that the Shiite Turkmens would lead Iraqi Shiites to support theses of the Turkmen people; however, the growing conflict suggests otherwise. Shiite Turkmen police are killing Sunni Turkmen, and Sunni Turkmen are retaliating. The inclusion of al-Qaeda groups among Sunni Turkmen has complicated the situated even more. It seems that religious ties are more important than the ethnic connection in Iraq. Unfortunately, Turkey’s attempts to resolve the conflict have not yielded results yet. Alternative to Habur lost meaning: Plans to open an alternative border gate as part of efforts to punish Barzani are not as meaningful. One of the alternative gates was from Ovaköy -- where only five kilometers of it was in the Kurdish region before-- now all of it is under Kurdish control. Hence, such alternatives are no longer strategically meaningful. Thus, an alternative to Habur should be economically feasible, but relevant institutions so far did not approve the idea. America training Peshmergas: Ankara is not happy with training of Peshmergas by the U.S. military in the Iraqi army; however, Ankara does not hold the view that the US took such a step due to its sympathy for Kurdish or its hostility toward Turkey. Instead, it is believed that the U.S. has no other group other than Kurds in building Iraqi army. Hence, Peshmergas are fighting for the Iraqi army in Mosul and Talafar. Turkey wants Sunni and other groups to serve in the Iraqi army as well. Cross-border operation: The purpose and method of the operation is very important. Is it to punish? To occupy? Will it be an air bombardment? These are all very important questions that need to be answered. Recent measures at the border gates are nothing new. However, an operation intended to punish has been done in the past and and is continuously spoken of. No one in Ankara has yet refused such a probability. Turkey has no problem with Iraq’s federal structure or the local administration in northern Iraq. The problem is the central and local administration’s lack of cooperation against terror and Barzani’s crazy statements. Kirkuk: Ankara still insists that the referendum be delayed. If a referendum is held, then Ankara wants all Iraqis to have a say on Kirkuk. After many reports on the sensitivity of the issue, Ankara believes the US has understood the problem in Kirkuk better, yet wants to adopt policies that will protect the weak Baghdad government by retaining Kurdish support. The official explained that slogans about “Kirkuk being lost” were far from reality because Kirkuk had already been lost in 1926 and added that “What did we do when Saddam was executing Turkmens?” This is a glimpse of Ankara’s perspective on Iraq, all which need to be thoroughly discussed.
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| 12 May 2007, Saturday |
| ABDULHAMİT BİLİCİ |
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