Given the profound influence of the French Enlightenment and their revolutionary ideals on the Young Turks and Kemalists, it is not surprising that Turkish secularism developed traits that resemble the earlier stages of French laicism. In the revolutionary context of France laicism acquired a strong dimension of anti-clericalism. Such anti-clericalism was an important characteristic of the Jacobinist political tradition characterizing the first decades of the Third French Republic (1871-1940). In many ways, what France went through then is similar to what the Turkish Republic is going through today.Based on the concept of “anti-clerical laicism” one can detect a strong resemblance between the Jacobinist and Kemalist understanding of secularism. In both cases, a centralist elite for whom religion became synonymous with counter-revolutionary segments of society upheld anti-clerical laicism as state policy. Militantly committed to safeguard their revolutionary zeal, both Kemalist and Jacobin political centers assumed progressive roles against regressive enemies. As a result, laicism, in this polarized Jacobin and Kemalist context became a dividing line separating progressive from conservative, modern from traditional, enlightened from obscurantist and revolutionary from reactionary. In that respect, Turkish and French laicism acquired the characteristics of an ideologically and politically charged concept that went beyond the parameters of Anglo-Saxon secularism.
Given the radical nature of the Kemalist cultural revolution, which aimed at rapidly catching up with Western civilization, Turkish modernizers more easily identified with Jacobinism rather than Anglo-Saxon liberalism. In that sense, the Turkish term “laiklik” derived from the French “laïque” reveals an intellectual and philosophical affinity. In other words, the Turkish term laiklik reflects a sense of “mission civilisatrice” that the Young Turks and Kemalist Republicans shared with their French counterparts. Laicism, in this Kemalist political vocabulary, became a test of modernity. To become enlightened, nationalist, republican, modern and civilized, Turkish citizens -- by definition -- had to be secular. Kemalists engaged in radical secularization because they believed that Islam, as a way of life, hampered the positivist project of transformation of the individual.
Despite important differences in their levels of democratic maturity and tolerance, both Turkey and France have republican political systems that continue to perceive laicism as the backbone of their revolutionary projects. For both countries, laicism became an integral part of first “establishing” and then “protecting” the republican ideology. In that ideological framework, the Kemalists, like the Jacobins, adopted patterns of anti-clericalism, and Turkish laicism turned into an authoritarian project of social engineering.
Along similar lines with the secularist left in France, the Kemalist founding fathers argued that religion should be relegated to the realm of individual conscience, with only a marginal role to play in public life. The common denominator of these French and Turkish models of militant laicism was that they targeted the social role of religion rather than religion per se. Both Turkish and French laicism were, for instance, keen on taking religion and religious symbols out of the public sphere. In that sense, their objective was the transfer of religion to the realm of the private.
Despite such philosophical affinity, Turkish and French laicism also have important differences. The evolution of French laicism culminated with the complete separation of church and state in 1905, whereas in contemporary Turkey religious affairs are still regulated by the state. Although the majority of French citizens are Catholic, the French state has no organic or institutional connection to any confession. However, in Turkey the state is not impartial towards all confessional groups because Sunni Islam is practically considered the state religion -- a situation that is increasingly resented by the Alevi minority, which represents about 15 percent of the total population.
Finally, the most important difference between French and Turkish laicism is ideological: in Turkey, laicism is considered to be the prerequisite of Westernization, whereas in France secularism has always emphasized democratization. This is a very important point because secularism in Turkey took hold at the expense of democratization. This is primarily because Turkish laicism considers an unchecked liberal democracy as potentially conducive to an Islamist takeover. As a result, laicism, in its Turkish context turned into an authoritarian and elitist political doctrine that legitimates a political role for the Turkish military as the guardian of modernization and progress. It is truly an irony of history that such an understanding of secularism is now distancing Turkey from the European Union.
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