Büyükanit’s speech reflected how deep the problems between Washington and Ankara have become. Any attempt to understand the current wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey must acknowledge that the US is now on the wrong side of the Kemalist debate in Turkey by supporting the idea of Turkey serving as a “model” for the Islamic world and by relying on the Kurds in Iraq. The US promoting a “moderate Islam” alarms Turkish secularists. Although Washington has now erased “model” from its Turkish political vocabulary -- replacing it with creative formulas like “source of inspiration” -- the damage is already done and there to stay, as we witnessed in Sezer’s speech. But this is not all. In addition to problems with secularism and Islam with the United States, there is also the Kurdish predicament. This is much trickier to solve because of America’s strong partnership with the Kurds in Iraq, the new Iraqi Constitution’s loose federalism, the status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and the Pentagon’s reluctance to take action against PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. All these factors rattle the Kemalist guardians in the Turkish military. Once again, Gen. Buyukanit’s speech made these points abundantly clear last week.
In analyzing Turkey’s frustration with the United States, one needs to go beyond the Bush administration’s negative global image. Turkey seems to present a sui generis case whereby anti-Americanism needs to be analyzed in light of the country’s own domestic dynamics and identity problems. But before doing so, it is important to clarify a couple of points. First, let us define what we mean by anti-Americanism. In the Arab world, and increasingly in Turkey, anti-Americanism is primarily fueled by disagreements with US foreign policy and not an intrinsic resentment against American culture, values or democracy. Quite the opposite, a majority of citizens in the Muslim world and in Turkey admire America and watch American movies, enjoy American food and want their children to study in the United States. Long lines in front of the US Embassy for visa and green card applications often tell the same story: “We love your country, but we hate your policies.”
In Turkey, the disagreement with American policies is far from new. Turkish-American relations witnessed their fair share of ups and downs during the Cold War, mostly in the form of Cyprus-centered episodes. These problems occasionally escalated to the level of “crisis,” with abundant drama and posturing, as in the case of the “Johnson letter” in 1969 and the weapons embargo in 1974. However, it is important to remember that such episodes took place in the context of a predictability provided by the Cold War. These were, after all, times of global and domestic ideological polarization where anti-Americanism belonged to the realm of the left. Today, however, what often tends to be overlooked is the fact that Ankara and Washington no longer share a common enemy. For Turkey, the “Axis of Evil” is hardly a good substitute for the “Evil Empire.” Iraq, Iran and of course North Korea have never posed clear and present threats to Turkey. The Soviet menace, on the other hand, was all too clear. It brought predictability as well as clear limits to Turkish-American differences.
Today, more than anything else, Turkey’s frustration with America is focused on the Kurdish issue. The developments in Iraq over the past four years have put the United States in an extremely negative light in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. Conspiracy theories about Washington’s willingness to create a Kurdish state are commonplace. Moreover, what makes the Kurdish issue particularly relevant is that it strongly affects Turkey’s perception of the European Union as well. After all, it is Brussels and not Washington that demands Ankara accept the Kurds as a national minority with distinct cultural and linguistic rights. In that sense, Turkey’s anti-Americanism often overlaps with anti-EU feelings as well. In short, we are on a very bumpy ride in our relations with Washington. This is not only because of American policies but also due to our deeply rooted identity problems with Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.
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