The parameters of the “resource curse” are well-known. Energy-rich countries can get away with no taxation, and no taxation means there is also no democratic representation. As a result, the price of oil and the pace of freedom go in opposite directions. This is the first law of petropolitics, as New York Times columnist Tom Friedman has called it. Let’s assume that petropolitics and the resource curse explain the absence of democracy in the Arab countries which are rich from oil and gas. What about the oil-poor Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco? They don’t have vast energy resources of the Gulf. Yet, they manage to remain stable and authoritarian. Well, political economists have an explanation for them too. They may not have energy incomes. But they still manage to gather significant “easy income” thanks to “strategic rental value.” In other words, these Arab countries are strategically very important to the United States. They therefore receive a lot of foreign aid and cheap loans, which in turn assures autocratic longevity. Often, these countries’ strategic importance is also closely related to relations with Israel. Peace with Tel Aviv translates into serious cash from Washington. That’s the working formula for Jordan and Egypt. It is no coincidence that Egypt became the second most important recipient of American foreign aid after the Camp David Accords in 1978.
In the case of Morocco, its strategic importance comes from its’ geographic proximity to Europe. To put it crudely, Europe wants Moroccans to stay in Morocco. Europe has enough problems with its own Arab-Muslim population, and therefore, Morocco’s economic and political stability is crucial. In the absence of such stability, massive Moroccan immigration would trouble France, Spain and Italy. But stability comes at a price, which the Europeans are willing to pay. This is why the Moroccan regime enjoys “strategic rent” as well -- just like Egypt and Jordan -- in the form of easy cash from the West.
The result? The short answer is there is autocratic stagnation in the Arab world. Democracy remains a distant dream because of the oil in the case of the countries surrounding the Gulf, and “strategic rents” in the rest of the Arab world. Is there a way out? Yes, but it will require major changes in the way the West operates. Democratization in the oil rich Arab countries will only be possible when Western economies are no longer dependent on plentiful oil and gas. This would reduce the price of oil and make it impossible for countries such as Saudi Arabia to maintain the autocratic status quo.
What about countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco? The good news is that the West has much more leverage with them. These countries, as discussed above, receive a lot of military and economic assistance. What is missing, however, are the incentives for democratic reforms. Unconditional aid is a big part of the problem. The solution is to pay serious consideration to democratization. Recipient countries should still receive aid from the West, but the aid should become contingent on democratic benchmarkers. Such a policy would require the West to pool its resources: Europe, the United States and Japan should coordinate their foreign aid policies. Currently such coordination amongst donor nations is missing. As a result, the recipient countries are able to play one donor against the other. If the EU, along with Washington and Tokyo, could co-ordinate their funding, their foreign assistance could be disbursed much more efficiently and thoughtfully.
One way to achieve this would be to pool all resources together into a new institution. A “Middle East Development Bank” could establish serious conditions for aid and lending, which should be based along the lines of a more modest version of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. The goal should be more democratic governance and institutional reform. Such conditions for reception of aid would create serious incentives for reform. If a country is not reforming, it should simply stop receiving foreign assistance. And reforming countries should qualify for even more funds. Such a coordinated Western policy of “generous conditionality” has never before been tried in the Middle East. It is time to give it a try. That is, of course, if the West is serious about democratization.