Turkish-Russian rapprochement: reality or fiction?

Ankara’s troubles with Washington are well known but worth repeating since they give Russia a positive image. Turkey’s most pressing concern is the Kurdish question in Iraq. The fact that the Kurds are now America’s best friends, and more importantly, the fact that the PKK has found a safe haven in northern Iraq is proving too much to digest for even the most pro-Western circles in Turkey. Washington’s inaction exacerbates Turkey’s conspiracy-prone political environment. As a result, everyone in Turkey believes a Kurdish state in northern Iraq is around the corner -- courtesy of the American invasion.

In addition to the Kurdish issue, Turkey’s anti-Americanism is compounded by another identity problem: radical secularism. America’s clumsy attempts to promote Turkey as a “model” or more recently as a “source of inspiration” in the Islamic world have disastrously backfired. The perception that America is supporting “moderate Islam” in Turkey deeply alienates the staunchly secularist Kemalist elite. Already alarmed about AK party’s so-called “hidden agenda” of Islamicization, the Kemalists have become the most anti-American circle in Turkey, closely followed by anti-Kurdish nationalists. The implications for Washington are bleak. By alienating the Kemalists and Turkish nationalists at the same time, America has basically “lost” most of Turkey.

But why should such Turkish frustration create a Turkish-Russian rapprochement? Mainly because Russia is now equally frustrated with America. Moscow has its own axe to grind with Washington because of its loss of influence in its’ “near abroad.” In that sense, Turkey’s troubles with Washington coincide with longer-term Russian disgruntlement over American encroachment in Eastern Europe, the Caucuses and Central Asia. Turkey and Russia’s concerns about Iran, Iraq and Syria also seem to converge. Both countries see in Iraq a chaos that has damaged their national interests -- Turkey more profoundly, but Russia as well, given its Iraqi oil contracts. In Iran, Turkey’s interests in heading off the PKK and the potential emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq complement Russia’s interests in investing in the Iranian civilian nuclear power and nurturing an anti-American ally. In Syria, Turkey sees a platform against a potential Kurdish state, while Russia is looking to rebuild relations with an old Soviet-era friend.

More important than their common interests in the Middle East, is Ankara and Moscow’s new agreement about their respective minority problems. Unlike during the 1990s, Turkey and Russia now support each other’s positions on Chechnya and the Kurds -- expressing similar fears of terrorism and separatism. This is hardly surprising. Russia and Turkey are both status-quo oriented powers. They put a high premium on stability in their neighborhood. They share an aversion towards potentially chaotic regime change and see the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda as a hegemonic and destabilizing policy that will damage their national interests on their southern tiers. Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that Putin’s Munich speech denouncing American unilateralism was put on the Turkish General Staff’s official website.